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Across the western United States, many irrigators who receive water
developed by the Bureau of Reclamation s ("Bureau") federal irrigation
projects are using that water illegally by spreading it to lands not
authorized to receive it. This "waterspeading"is one of severalfactors
contributingto low flows in the Columbia and Snake River Basinslow flows That threaten the recovery of threatened and endangered
salmon species. Rather than rely on the Bureau to use its authority to
control water spreading, which the agency has failed to do in the last
two decades, perhaps the most promising strategy to stop water
spreading employs the procedural and substantive requirements of the
EndangeredSpecies Act ("ESA "). This articleexamines the alication
of those requirements to the illegal water spreading that the Hureau has
long ignored in the PacificNorthwest, assertingt e Bureau'sfailure to
stop water spreading is an agency action" under section 7 of the ESA
that "may affect" the survival and recovery of listed salmon. The
Bureau's fadlure to act violates affirmative duties under the
reclamationlaws, subsequently enactedfederal environmental laws and
the federal-tribal trust obligation. If the Bureau'sfailure to control
water spreadingfallsunder the purview of section 7, the agency may be
required to use its statutory authority to re-assert control over illegally
spread water in order to keep that water in rivers for endangered
salmon.
I. INTRODUCTION

Established in 1903 and skirting the Oregon-California border, the
Klamath Basin National Wildlife Refuge ("Refuge") complex was once
a collage of lakes, wetlands, forest, and grasslands, home to a diverse
array of fish and wildlife species, including endangered salmon.1
1. The "Klamath Marsh National Wildlife Refuge" actually consists of six separate
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Within two years of the Refuge's establishment, however, the United
States Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") began to "reclaim" the lakes
and marshes of the Lower Klamath and Tule Lake areas, converting
them to "productive" agricultural lands. The Bureau appropriated all
available water rights in the Klamath River and Lost River and their
Oregon tributaries and began constructing a series of water diversion
projects.' Over the years, in conjunction with the Klamath projects,
the Bureau and water users have entered into over 250 water delivery
contracts.' The reclamation projects converted wetlands to lands
newly suitable for agriculture, and today, only one-quarter of the
historic wetlands remain.'
In September 2000, in order to protect endangered coho salmon
in the Klamath River and endangered Lost River and shortnose
suckers in Upper Klamath Lake, the Bureau ordered the Refuge to
seal off its refuge wetlands and pass the water flows through a canal
system directly to the Klamath River. This order was the result of
recent lawsuits in which the Ninth Circuit rejected irrigators' claims
that they were third-party beneficiaries to a 1956 contract between the
United States and the private dam operator who delivered stored water

wildlife refuges: Lower Klamath, Tule Lake, and Clear Lake Refuges in northern
California, and Bear Valley, Upper Klamath, and Klamath Marsh Refuges in southern
Oregon. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Refuge Histoiy: Klamath Basin National Wildlife
Refuges, at http://www.klamathnwr.org/history.html (last modified Jan. 17, 2001)
[hereinafter Refuge Histoy]. The refuges are all part of the National Wildlife Refuge
System. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
2. Act of Feb. 9, 1905, ch. 567, 33 Stat. 714 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 601
(1994)) (Klamath Project). For an environmental history of the Klamath Basin and
other reclamation projects in Oregon, as well as a pair of maps showing the extent of
the Klamath Project's reduction in wetlands and lakes, see WLLAM G. ROBBINS,
LANDSCAPES OF PROMISE: THE OREGON STORY 1800-1940, at 250-58 (1997). For an
overview of the Klamath Project with particular attention given to adjudication of
water rights in the Klamath Basin, see Peter G. Scott, State Certification of Inchoate Water
Rights on the Upper Lost River: A Prelude to the Klamath Adjudication, 13 J. ENvTL. L. &
LITIG. 475 (1998).
3. Klamath Water Users Ass'n v. Patterson, 15 F. Supp. 2d 990, 991-92 (D. Or.
1998) [hereinafter Patterson I]. See also Scott, supra note 2, at 479-80 (providing
legislative history of the Klamath Project).
4. Patterson 1, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
5. Refuge Histoiy, supra note 1, at 1. While the region remains one of the premier
stops along the Pacific Coast Flyway migratory bird corridor, it is a shadow of its
former self with respect to terrestrial species habitat. See id.
6. Beth Quinn, Water Cut Off to Klamath Refuge, OREGONIAN, Sept. 9, 2000, at Al.
Federal officials prevented water that would normally flow into the wetlands from
doing so, by instead diverting the water through canals directly to the Klamath River.
The Bureau decided to resume "limited flows" less than two weeks later, but refuge
officials said the flows were "too low to allow flooding of seasonal marshes that millions
of migrating birds use each fall." Beth Quinn, Water Again Flows to Refuge; Conflicts
Continue, OREGONIAN, Sept. 21, 2000, at El. Then, a week after that, the Bureau
announced it would be able to provide enough water to flood the entire 40,000-acre
refuge by the late-October peak of the bird migration season. Jeff Barnard, Managers
Find Way to Flood Lower Klamath Refuge, OREGONIAN, Sept. 29, 2000, at C3. The Bureau
claimed an early September storm, voluntary irrigation cutbacks by farmers, and
reservoir capacity provided enough water to resume refuge marsh flooding. Id.
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to the irrigators The irrigators argued that because of their alleged
third-party beneficiary status, the Bureau and the dam operator were
obligated to provide the full contractual amount of water to the
irrigators.8 Instead, the court concluded the irrigators were not
"intended third party beneficiaries," the Bureau could amend the 1956
contract with regard to the operator's rights and obligations to operate
the dam without the irrigators' consent, and the irrigators' water rights
"are subservient to senior tribal water rights and
to subsequent
legislative enactments by Congress, such as the Endangered Species
Act." 9 As a result, the Bureau ordered the Refuge to divert water flows
directly to the Klamath River, bypassing Refuge wetlands.
While the increased river flows were good news for the fish, the
water curtailments came at the expense of local irrigators who depend
on Bureau water diversions for crops, and the eight to ten million
migratory birds that pass through the Refuge's wetlands annually."0
On the surface, this choice seems like the quintessential Catch-22
situation, with no satisfactory solutions. In reality, however, many
similar situations involving water shortages for rivers and Bureau of
Reclamation projects are avoidable. The cancer that is eating into
many Bureau projects' water allocations across the Pacific Northwestand ultimately eating into Pacific Northwest streamflows-is the illegal
practice of "water spreading."
Water spreading involves the use of federal water on lands that the
Bureau has not authorized for such use." Federal water is water
developed under a federal irrigation project or water diverted or
delivered through federally built facilities. 2
Lands may lack
authorization to receive water from projects constructed and managed
by the Bureau because of the legislative provisions authorizing the
project," provisions of a water user's contract with the Bureau, the
7. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th
Cir. 2000) [hereinafter PattersonII], afg 15 F. Supp. 2d 990 (D. Or. 1998), cert. denied,
Klamath Drainage Dist. v. Patterson, 121 S. Ct. 44 (2000).
8. PattersonII, 204 F.3d at 1210.
9. Patterson1, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
10. This solution presents an interesting conflict between fish and other aquatic
species that need water instream to survive, and migratory birds that need water to
remain in the wetlands for their biannual migrations. Between irrigation water
withdrawals and reclamation and conversion of wetlands, both habitats rapidly
degraded beginning around the turn of the last century. As a result, the fish versus
migratory bird trade-off looms large today. See ROBBINS, supra note 2, at 250-53.
11. Reed D. Benson & KimberleyJ. Priestley, Making a Wrong Thing Right: Ending
the "Spread" of Reclamation Project Water, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LrrIG. 89, 92 (1994). The
Bureau defines water spreading as "the unauthorized use of federally developed
project water or facilities on lands not previously approved by Reclamation for such
use." Id. at 92 n.10 (quoting U.S. BuREAu OF RECLAMATION, WATER SPREADING (Mar. 3,
1994)) (on file with author).
12. Id. at 92 (citing Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 371(d) (1988)). Benson and
Priestley also note that "[s]ome irrigators have repayment contracts with the Bureau
because they use federally built facilities to divert or deliver their water, even though it
is not 'project water."' Id. at92 n.12.
13. 43 U.S.C. § 371(d) (1994) ("'project' means a Federal irrigation project
authorized by the reclamation law"). Acts of Congress authorize such projects. See,
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statutory requirement that lands be classified by the Bureau as
irrigable, or state water law requirements." Water spreading may take
one of several forms, including: (1) irrigation of lands outside of
Bureau district or project boundaries; (2) irrigation within district or
project boundaries on lands classified by the Bureau as non-irrigable
or ineligible to receive water; (3) changing the nature or place of
project water without Bureau authorization; (4) receiving water
without obtaining a required state water right; or1 (5) irrigation of
more acres than the number authorized for service.
Not only is water spreading illegal, it is fundamentally unfair to
those who depend upon an adequate supply of precious western water,
including threatened and endangered salmonid and other Pacific
Northwest fish species." Water spreading is also responsible for
myriad serious and widespread environmental and social problems.
These problems include decreased water quantity and quality, altered
timing of return flows, significant losses of potential federal revenues
because irrigators use water for which they have not paid, and the
unfair result whereby unauthorized uses take water that could be
reallocated to junior appropriators or instream uses." A number of
solutions have been suggested to address water spreading, the most
obvious of which would be for the Bureau simply to assert the
authority it already has under the Reclamation Act'9 to stop the illegal
practice, secure control over illegally used water, and re-allocate that
20
water to instream uses.
Rather than rely on the Bureau to take actions it has consistently
resisted-presumably because "capture" of the Bureau by irrigators has
resulted in a long-standing preference for dam building and irrigation
that has resisted change -perhaps the most promising strategy to
stop water spreading employs the procedural and substantive
e.g., Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556 (1994) (Central Arizona
Project at § 1521).
14. Id. § 485g (Classification of lands).
15. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 92.
16. See Nathan Baker, Water, Water, Everywhere, and at Last a Dropfor Salmon? NRDC
v. Houston HeraldsNew Prospects Under Section 7 of the EndangeredSpecies Act, 29 ENVTL. L.
607, 621 (1999).
17. Matters can be even more intricate, as evidenced in the Klamath Basin National
Wildlife Refuge complex where endangered bald eagles also vie for water in refuge
marshes as they prey on waterfowl during the winter. See Quinn, Water Cut Off to
Klamath Refuge, supra note 6, at Al. Part II of this article details the plight of
endangered salmon in the Columbia and Snake River basins, and the 1990s onset of
the "Endangered Species Act era" of salmon management. See also Michael C. Blumm,
Sacrificing the Salmon: A Legal and Policy History of the Decline of Columbia Basin Salmon
202-03 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
18. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 97-100; David M. Howitt, Oregon Water
Management: The Need to Combat Water Spreading and Some Proposalsfor the Future, 9 J.
ENVTL. L. & LrnG. 249, 257 (1994).
19. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-431 (1994) (as amended).
20. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 105-13. See infra Part V.D (Bureau
authorities to control water spreading).
21. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 91 (citing to MARc REIsNER, CADILLAC

DESERT (1986)).
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requirements of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")." Section 7 of
the ESA requires that federal agency actions must not "jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat." 3 If an
agency determines an action "may affect" listed species or critical
habitat, the agency must formally consult with either the Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS") or the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS") .4 FWS or NMFS must then determine whether the action is
likely to jeopardize any protected species or adversely modify
designated critical habitat.25 Section 7 prohibits federal agencies from
making "irreversible or irretrievable commitment[s] of resources"
until either the FWS or the NMFS has made its determination. 6
In 1998, the Ninth Circuit held renewals of federal water delivery
contracts constitute "agency actions" under the ESA, triggering section
7 's procedural
and substantive requirements.
In 2000, the Ninth
Circuit held the Bureau retains control over its dams and has the legal
duty to direct dam operations to comply with the ESA and tribal water
rights. Because the Bureau has an affirmative legal duty to control its
federal water according to reclamation laws, subsequently enacted
federal environmental statutes, and senior tribal water rights, 9 the
Bureau's practice of allowing water spreading to continue unabated is
an "agency action" subject to section 7 consultation. If the ESA
extends to the Bureau's failure to control water spreading, the Act may
require the Bureau to use its statutory authority to re-assert control
over illegally spread water in order to keep that water in rivers for
endangered salmon.
This article examines the application of the procedural and
substantive requirements of the ESA to the illegal water spreading the
Bureau has long ignored in the Columbia and Snake River basins.
Part II briefly outlines the role of endangered salmon in Pacific
Northwest water use conflicts, and explains how ESA protection has
ushered in a new era of salmon management and protection. Part III
examines the establishment of the Bureau under the Reclamation Act,
the role of the prior appropriation doctrine in the Act, and the social
and environmental costs of water spreading. Part IV reviews the
procedural and substantive requirements of the ESA. Part V asserts
that the Bureau's failure to stop illegal water spreading is an "agency
22. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).

23. Id. § 1536(a) (2).
24. 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.01(b), 402.14(a) (2000). In the case of anadromous salmon,
NMFS is the relevant wildlife agency in the consultation process.

25. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (3) (A).
26. Id. § 1536(d).
27. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).
Contract renewals occur somewhat infrequently, as repayment and water service
contracts may be fixed for periods of up to 40 years. See 43 U.S.C. § 485h(d), (e)
(1994). See also infra notes 64-65 (defining repayment and water service contracts).
28. PattersonII, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2000).
29.

See infra Part V.C.1.
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action" under the ESA that "may affect" the survival and recovery of
listed salmon, and therefore subjects the Bureau to the ESA's "no
jeopardy" and "duty to conserve" requirements. This article concludes
the ESA may be the most promising and readily available strategy to
control water spreading in the Pacific Northwest and "reclaim" water
for endangered salmon that need adequate instream flows to ensure
the survival of their species.
H. ENDANGERED SALMON: AN IMPERILED CULTURAL,
ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ICON
The cultural, economic, and political significance of salmon in the
Pacific Northwest has been described in great detail many times
before."
To place the issue in context, however, it is useful to
emphasize a few important points in the complex and often tragic
history of the salmon. Salmon have been at the very core of human
culture in the Pacific Northwest for as long as humans have lived
there." For Indian tribes, who for millennia have called vast reaches of
the Columbia and Snake River basins home, fishing for salmon went
beyond mere subsistence. Salmon permeated Indian culture and
spirituality, giving rise to traditions such as the springtime "First
Salmon Ceremony" and even causing some tribes to call themselves
"The Salmon People."32
As Euro-Americans' insatiable push westward filled the region with
increasing numbers of settlers, the settlers too became dependent on
the bountiful salmon runs. Columbia Basin salmon harvests exploded
in the nineteenth century,"3 and the growing non-Indian population
began to demand more and more Indian land to settle upon. The
Indians and settlers entered into the Stevens and Palmer treaties in the
1850s, ostensibly guaranteeing the Indians small land reserves and the
right to continue to harvest salmon "in common with" the EuroAmerican settlers at all "usual and accustomed" native fishing
grounds." Twentieth-century federal court decisions have interpreted
those treaty rights to give treaty tribes a range of guarantees, including
30. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 17, at 3-4; THE NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS: A
DOcUMENTARY HISTORY iv (Joseph Cone & Sandy Ridlington eds., 1996) [hereinafter
NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS]; ROBBINS, supra note 2, at 305; RICHARD WHITE, THE
ORGANIC MACHINE: THE REMAKING OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER 89-92 (1995); CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST

175-218 (1992).
31. See, e.g., William G. Robbins, The World of Columbia River Salmon: Nature, Culture,
and the Great River of the West, in NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS, supranote 30, at 2.

32.

Blumm, supra note 17, at 3 (citing AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., UNCOMMON

CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKEISHOOT, PUYALLUP AND NISQUALLY INDIANS

3 (1970)).
33.

See, e.g., R.D. Hume, Salmon of the Pacific Coast, in NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS,

supra note 30, at 60-64 (discussing salmon canning business and prospects for further
development).
34. For a summary of the treaties and their "negotiation," see Stevens Treaty
Negotiations, in NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS, supra note 30, at 176-80, and the
accompanying commentary.
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the right to half of the harvestable salmon, a right of habitat
protection for the salmon runs, and easement rights to cross private
lands to harvest salmon at traditional fishing places."5
The twentieth century has seen the salmon resource become vastly
depleted from a range of human activities, including over-harvest,
water pollution from logging and grazing activities, reduced flows and
altered timing of flows from water withdrawals, manipulation of
Northwest stream hydrographs, biological degradation from a century
of hatchery fish introductions, and-the most devastating effect of
all-the explosion of dam-building for hydropower and storage
projects. 6 Numerous strategies have failed to solve the rapid decline
of salmon, from scientific and technological fixes such as hatchery
supplementation, barging and trucking, to legal fixes such as the
Northwest Power Act3 and the Pacific Salmon Treaty.3' Despite many
politicians' and agencies' greatest efforts, by the early 1990s, salmon
were far too imperiled to stave off the impending ESA listings. In
1990, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe petitioned to list Snake River
sockeye, and a coalition of environmental groups petitioned to list
Snake River chinook and coho runs.39 NMFS listed the sockeye and
two chinook species in 1992."o Today, twenty-six evolutionarily
significant units ("ESUs") of West Coast salmon and steelhead are
listed as threatened or endangered."
Adequate flow (water quantity), cold water, and spawning gravel
35. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 17, at 16-18, 286-93. Blumm refers to the servitude
across private lands that allows Indians to fish at their traditional fishing places as a
"piscary profit." Id. at 290. See also infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text for a
brief discussion of the Indian treaty fishing rights cases.
36. See generally Michael C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon
Simultaneously: The Biological,Economic, and Legal Casefor Breaching the Lower Snake River
Dams, LoweringJohn Day Reservoir, and Restoring Natural River flows, 28 ENvTL. L. 997,
1006-09 (1998) (conditions of Snake River salmon and reasons for decline).
37. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
839-839h (1994).
38. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S.
No. 11,091.
39. Blumm, supranote 17, at 24.
40. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Listing of the Snake River
Sockeye Salmon as an Endangered Species, 57 Fed. Reg. 212 (Jan. 3, 1992) (codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 217); Endangered and Threatened Species: Threatened Status for
Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, Threatened Status for Snake River Fall
Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (Apr. 22, 1992) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227).
41. Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Fisheries, Endangered Species Act Status of
West
Coast
Salmon
&
Steelhead,
at
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsalmon/salmesa/pubs/lpgr.pdf (last updated June 20,
2000). An ESU is a species population that is "substantially reproductively isolated"
from other populations and represents an "important component in the evolutionary
legacy of the species." Policy on Applying the Definition of Species Under the
Endangered Species Act to Pacific Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612, (Nov. 20, 1991). The
term "species" in the ESA includes subspecies and "distinct population segment[s]."
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994). The ESU concept
represents NFMS's interpretation of the term "distinct population segment," for
purposes of anadromous fish. 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,612.

THE IRRIGATED DESERT

Issue 2

are key to the survival and eventual recovery of these listed fish species.
For example, NMFS stated in its designation of critical habitat for
Snake River sockeye salmon that essential features of that critical
habitat include substrate, water quality, water quantity, water
temperature, water velocity, cover and shelter, food, riparian
vegetation, space, and migration conditions.4 2 Perhaps the key factor
implicated in water spreading is adequate flow because the amount of
water illegally used for irrigation could be returned to the rivers to
contribute to restoration of the flow levels the fish need to survive. In
flow
its 1995 proposed recovery plan, NMFS established minimum
41
objectives that were "likely to avoid high [salmon] mortality."
The upshot of the salmon listings of the 1990s was a major shift in
attention from the Northwest Power Act and the Pacific Salmon Treaty
to the ESA as the new "promise" for survival and recovery of salmon.
The ESA introduced a wider scope of inquiry regarding land
management activities, which in turn amplified to an unprecedented
level, the friction and conflict in the Northwest over declining salmon
populations.45 Historian Richard White once summarized the central
historical place of salmon in Northwest culture as follows:
In the beginning it had been salmon that had drawn humans
to the river. The places where the river's energy was greatest-at the
Dalles and the Cascades, and Celilo Falls, at Kettle Falls and Priest
Rapids-had concentrated the salmon when they returned to spawn,
and at these places fishermen, too, concentrated.

The energy

harvested and stored by salmon for theirjourney had become calories
that supported human life along the river. Salmon had knit together
and
the energy of land and sea; they had knit together human
46
nonhuman labor; salmon had defined the river for millennia.

Behind the ESA listings and the lawsuits seeking to protect salmon and
their habitat from a human-induced extinction, one must always bear
in mind the history that animates salmon issues today.
m. THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION AND THE RISE OF WATER
SPREADING
THE RECLAMATION ACT AND BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS

A.

In 1902, Congress passed the Reclamation

Act, 47

which established

42. Designated Critical Habitat; Snake River Sockeye Salmon, Snake River
Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, and Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 58 Fed.
Reg. 68,543, 68,546 (Dec. 28, 1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 226).
43. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMosPHERIc ADMIN., NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN FOR SNAKE RIVER SALMON app. F at F-10, F-12, F-13 (1995)
[hereinafter PROPOSED RECOvERY PLAN].

44. Blumm, supranote 17, at 23-24.
45.

Id.

46. WHrrE,supra note 30, at 89.
47. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-431 (1994) (as amended).
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the Bureau in the Department of the Interior.4 ' The Act's purpose was
to provide water for irrigation in the arid western states, and its social
and agricultural goals were part of a national policy of disposing of
western lands.4 9 As the Ninth Circuit observed, the Act's three primary
goals were "to create family-sized farms in areas irrigated by federal
projects... , to secure the wide distribution of the substantial subsidy
involved in reclamation projects and [to] limit private speculative
gains resulting from the existence of such projects." ° Although the
Desert Lands Acte' opened up much land to homesteading and state
prior appropriation laws allowed settlers to divert water and put it to
beneficial uses, the general scarcity of water resources remained a
problem." Because private irrigation efforts did not develop the
amount of water expected, Congress opted for federal construction,
ownership and operation of irrigationprojects, hoping to pave the way
for widespread settlement in the West.
Congress envisioned the Reclamation Act as impetus forJefferson's
agrarian ideal,54 and limited water deliveries to a maximum of 160
acres per "any one person."55 Enforcement, however, was never taken
seriously. In Congress's 1982 amendment of the Reclamation Act,57
the 160-acre limit was revised to require landowners who exceeded a
new 960-acre limit to pay "full cost" for Bureau water. 58 The 1982
Reclamation Reform Act also supplemented the purposes of federal
reclamation projects to include hydropower, industrial, and municipal
uses.59 Particular reclamation projects also provided for recreation,
fish and wildlife protection, flood control, and navigational benefits."
48. Id. § 373a.
49. See Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1990).
50. Id. at 803 (quoting United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1119
(9th Cir 1976).
51. Desert Lands Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-29 (1994) (as amended).
52. Even though Congress had opened up western lands for settlement, that action
alone could not solve the issue that was most critical to the western settler's survival:
procurement of water.
53. The western states also "lacked the means to finance the enormous systems of
dams, reservoirs, and canals needed to regulate and distribute water from the western
rivers and snow melt." Peterson, 899 F.2d at 802.
54. "The legislative history of the 1902 Act is replete with references to the antimonopoly and anti-speculation goals of the bill and to Congress's desire that the
federally subsidized water be used to create landholding patterns consistent with its
vision of an agrarian society of family-owned farms." Id.at 802-03 n.8.
55. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 375 (1994).
56. See, e.g., Paul S. Taylor, Calfornia Water Project:Law and Politics,5 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1, 1 (1975); Excess Land Law: Calculated Circumvention, 52 CAL. L. REv. 978, 978 (1964);
Excess Land Law: Secretary's Decision? A Study in Administration of Federal-StateRelations, 9
UCLA L. REv. 1, 1 (1962); The Excess Land Law: Pressure vs. Principle,47 CAL. L. REv.
499 (1959); The Excess Land Law: Execution of a PublicPolicy, 64 YALE LJ.477 (1955).
57. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat.1263 (1982)
(codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa to 390zz-1).
58. 43 U.S.C. § 390ee (1994).
59. Id. §§ 390-390b.
60. See section 3406(b) (2) of the Reclamation Projects Authorization and
Adjustment Act of 1992, which requires the Secretary of Interior to "dedicate and
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Today, seventeen western states have Bureau facilities, including 348
storage reservoirs, 59 hydroelectric power plants, over 250 diversion
dams, and over 200 projects.
The Bureau delivers about thirty
million acre-feet of water annually in the seventeen western states, over
eighty-five percent of which goes to irrigators. The remaining fifteen
percent is delivered to municipal, industrial, and other uses.
The original incarnation of the Reclamation Act allowed individual
irrigators to contract directly with the Bureau. Today, however,
irrigators receive water from delivery organizations such as irrigation
districts, water users' associations, or conservancy districts. '
The
delivery organizations enter into either repayment or water service
contracts with the Bureau. Under a repayment contract, the Bureau
delivers water to an irrigation district or similar organization in return
for scheduled payrnents reflecting a portion of the costs of the
individual project. Under a water service contract, the organization
instead agrees to pay a set annual rate for deliveries from the Bureau. 66
In short, despite a number of amendments and refinements over the
years, the basic goals and schemes of the reclamation laws remain
essentially the same today as when the Reclamation Act was enacted
nearly a century ago.

manage annually eight hundred thousand acre-feet of Central Valley Project
[California] yield for the primary purpose of implementing the fish, wildlife, and
habitat restoration purposes and measures authorized by this title." Pub. L. No. 102575, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390h to 390h-16
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999) & 16 U.S.C. 4601-31 to -34 (1994)).
61. U.S. BuREAu OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
ACREAGE LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION RULES AND REGULATIONS, at 3-3 (1996);

U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, INVESTING IN THE FUTuRE: 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 12
(1999), availableat http://www.usbr.gov/tcg/annrep98/ (last modifiedJune 20, 2000)
[hereinafter 1998 ANNuAL REPORT]; U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Dataweb, at
http://dataweb.usbr.gov/ (last modified Oct. 22, 2000). See also Reed D. Benson,
Whose Water Is It? PrivateRights and PublicAuthority Over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA.
ENvrL. L.J. 363, 366 (1997) (over 25,000 miles of canals and pipelines, over 37,000
miles of distribution laterals, and over 17,000 miles of drains) [hereinafter Benson,
Whose Water Is It?]. The term "project" means "any irrigation project authorized by
Federal reclamation law, or constructed by the United States pursuant to such law, or
in connection with a repayment or water service contract.... or any project
constructed by the United States through Reclamation for the reclamation of lands."
43 C.F.R. § 426.2 (2000).
62. Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supra note 61, at 364. The Bureau delivers water to
about ten million acres of irrigated land, which is about one-third of the total irrigated
acres in the West. 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 61, at 12.
63. Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supra note 61, at 371.
64. Id. at 387. Congress authorized the Bureau to contract with districts in 1922,
and then in 1926, required that all future contracts be made with irrigation districts
only. Id. SeeAct of May 25, 1926, ch. 383, § 45, 44 Stat. 636 (1926). "No water shall be
delivered upon the completion of any new project or new division of a project until a
contract or contracts in form approved by the Secretary of the Interior shall have been
made with an irrigation district or irrigation districts organized under State law ..
43 U.S.C. § 423e (1994).
65. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(d) (requirements for repayment contracts) (originally
enacted as Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 1, 53 Stat. 1187).
66. Id. § 485h(e) (requirements for water service contracts).
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PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE AND THE RECLAMATION ACT

Because of the scarcity of water in the West, the prior
appropriation doctrine took root well over a century ago, requiring a
prospective water user to divert water and put it to beneficial use.6 ,
The doctrine originated from nineteenth-century mining customs,
under which miners diverted water from streams to flush out mineral
deposits."' The Reclamation Act followed the doctrine by requiring
the Bureau to allocate water according to state law-according to the
law of prior appropriation.69 Therefore, because western states have
asserted authority over the waters within their boundaries, federal
reclamation projects must obtain state water rights.
All western states employ some form of the prior appropriation
doctrine, which essentially revolves around the "first in time, first in
right" principle. The doctrine generally consists of a handful of rules:
(1) states control the use of water in the West; (2) older ("senior")
water rights have higher priority over more recently established
('junior") water rights; (3) water rights may be appropriated only for a
"beneficial use" and only enough water to satisfy that beneficial use
may be appropriated; (4) in addition to being tied to a particular
beneficial use, water rights are appurtenant to a particular place; (5)
new appropriations of water require a state water resources agency to
issue a permit; (6) a water user must obtain state approval to change a
point of diversion, a purpose of use or a place of use; and (7) water
users who fail to exercise their water
rights may lose those rights
71
through forfeiture or abandonment.
The appurtenancy requirement ranks as particularly significant in
the context of water spreading. The Reclamation Act declares: "The
right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall
be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the
basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."7 This appurtenancy
provision makes water spreading practices illegal. Such practices
include irrigating lands outside project boundaries, irrigating lands
classified as non-irrigable, irrigating without an appropriate state water
right, or irrigating an excess number of acres.

67. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 233-35. See also Charles F. Wilkinson, In
Memoriam, PriorAppropriation 1848-1991, 21 ENVTL. L. v (1991) (whimsical account of

the birth and "life and times" of the doctrine).
68. Karen A. Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest: Eliminating Waste as a Way of
Restoring Streamflows, 27 ENVrL. L. 151, 154 (1997).

69. See Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1994).
70. Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supranote 61, at 372-75.
71. See Reed D. Benson, Maintainingthe Status Quo: ProtectingEstablished Water Uses
in the PacificNorthwest, Despite the Rules of PriorAppropriation, 28 ENVrL. L. 881, 885-87
(1998) [hereinafter Benson, Maintainingthe Status Quo]; WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §
12.01 at 1-2 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
72. 43 U.S.C. § 372.
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C. THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL COSTS OF WATER SPREADING

Water spreading is a simple legal concept, but the practice carries
with it serious and widespread environmental and social problems. 3
Environmentally, water spreading reduces water quantity, degrades
water quality, and alters the timing of return flows, affecting both
rivers and groundwater." Obviously, if the massive quantity of illegally
used water was made available for instream uses, such as fish and
wildlife habitat, such uses would reduce significantly the stress on
endangered salmon species. Irrigation return flows, also, cause serious
water quality problems in many parts of the West because these flows
carry salts, heavy metals, and other contaminants.75 The Bureau
determines the presence and extent of potential environmental
problems,
including "toxic
••
76 or hazardous irrigation return flows," when
it classifies land parcels.
If an irrigator spreads water to lands not
classified or considered by the Bureau, there is an increased risk of
polluted return flows that potentially can skew the assumptions upon
which the Bureau bases its water quality calculations and subsequent
management decisions.
Some observers have suggested that the most serious
environmental problem with water spreading is its cumulative effects
upon western rivers and streams.77 The hundreds of thousands of
acres of illegally watered land in the Pacific Northwest contribute to
low river flows that threaten the survival and recovery of salmon.78 As
of 1995, at least 184 of the individual fish and wildlife species either
listed or proposed for listing as threatened or endangered under the
ESA had habitat affected by Bureau projects and water service areas."'
The decline of over fifty surface water dependent listed fish species is
linked directly to irrigation withdrawals, with agricultural activities
cited in those species' Federal Register listing notices as a "factor in
decline" of the species." In its 1995 and 2000 proposed recovery plan

73. Baker, supra note 16, at 619-21. See also, Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at
97-100; Howitt, supra note 18, at 257.

74. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 99.
75. Id.

76. 43 U.S.C. § 390a (1994). This section sets conditions precedent to construction
of dams or reservoirs, and supply of water. It requires that the Secretary "shall certify
to the Congress that an adequate soil survey and land classification has been made and
that the lands to be irrigated are susceptible to the production of agricultural crops by
means of irrigation." Id. The surveys must include "an investigation of soil
characteristics which might result in toxic or hazardous irrigation return flows." Id.
77. See Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 100.
78. See id. Along with low stream flows from irrigation, other major factors
contributing to the demise of salmon are dams, logging, livestock grazing, urban water
pollution, genetic degradation, and predation. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 30, at 8990.
79. Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American West: Endangered Fish
Versus Irrigated Agriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319, 320-21 (1996) (citing U.S.
BuREAu OF RECLAMATION, PROPOSED ACREAGE LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION
RULES AND REGULATIONS 3-85 (1995)).

80. Id. at 328.
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for Snake River Salmon, NMFS called for the Bureau to "identify and
halt" water spreading on Bureau projects in the Columbia River
Basin.8 '
Water spreading also causes its share of social harms, most notably
to the "public fisc." Irrigators who use water on lands not authorized
to receive the water are paying less money to the Bureau than they
owe.83 While the Bureau has recognized it is losing money due to
water spreading, it has never taken any systematic efforts to estimate
how much it is losing. 4 One Bureau official, testifying before Congress
in 1992, estimated the federal government's losses resulting from
water spreading to be fifteen million dollars per year. 5 Other
estimates range as high as thirty-seven to forty-six million dollars for
the period 1984-1992. 86 Losses on this scale amount to an enormous
government subsidy for irrigators who take advantage of the Bureau's
less-than-stringent enforcement of its obligation to stop illegal water
spreading. In addition to social harm from a financial perspective,
allowing water spreading to continue is bad policy because the illegally
used water could be used for junior appropriators, instream rights,
reallocation by state water commissions, and other users who wish to
play by the rules.8 7
Despite these social harms, some irrigators argue water spreading
is actually "water saving."" These irrigators maintain that, rather than
wasting or stealing water, they are in fact conserving water through the
use of advanced irrigation technologies. 9 For example, some
irrigators have replaced "rill" irrigation systems that simply flood fields
with more efficient, computerized sprinkler systems. 90 Nevertheless,
the irrigators who apply this "saved" water to additional fields increase
their profits at the expense of fellow irrigators following the rules,
other potential water users (including instream uses), and ultimately
federal taxpayers.
Although the Bureau has been aware of the problem for a long
81. PROPOSED RECOvERY PLAN, supra note 43, at V-2-26. See infra Part V.E. for more
detail on the hydrosystem biological opinions' discussion of water spreading.
82. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 97.
83. Id. Although irrigators technically are using only the amount of water they pay
for, the fact they apply that water to lands ineligible to receive it for whatever reason
essentially gives the irrigators more benefit than they bargained for.
84. Id. at 98.
85. Id. (citing Hearing to Examine the Underminingof an Effective Civil Service: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1992) (statement of Bureau of Reclamation official Phillip
Doe)).
86. Paul Koberstein, Waterfor the Taking: Some IrrigatorsGet Loose with the Law, HIGH
COUNTRY
NEWS,
Oct.
31,
1994,
at
2,
at
http://www.hcn.org/servets/hcn.Article?article_id=640.
87. Howitt, supranote 18, at 257.
88. Koberstein, supra note 86, at 3-4.
89. Id. at 4.
90. Id. See also Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 95 (noting that open unlined
ditches which have been converted to lined ditches, pipe laterals, and sprinkler
systems have "conserved" additional water available to irrigators) (citation omitted).
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time, quantification of water spreading-geographically, by acre-feet of
water, or by reduction in streamflows-is difficult. The Bureau first
attempted to quantify the problem in 1983, estimating that 662,000
acres of unclassified lands were illegally receiving project waters in the
western states.91 Two-thirds of that acreage was located in the Bureau's
Pacific Northwest Region, while the remaining six regions reported
significantly lower acreages. Although the report recommended that
nearly four million acres of western land needed some classification
work, the Bureau seems to have made little progress determining the
In short, the
locations and extent of water spreading practices.
significant.
are
spreading
water
of
environmental and social costs
the
decline
to
contributing
factors
of
the
Because the practice is one
to
is
subject
spreading
water
of the salmon, one finds only fitting that
the procedural and substantive requirements of the law that attempts
to reverse this biological trend: the Endangered Species Act.
IV. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REQUIREMENTS
Congress passed the ESA in 1973, "to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved." 95 The ESA declares a national policy "that
all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve
endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter."96 Courts
have long recognized that "examination of the language, history, and
structure" of the ESA "indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities." 97 The
ESA achieves its goals primarily through two important provisions: the
section 9 "take" prohibition and the section 7 consultation
requirements.
A.

THE SECTION 9 "TAKE" PROHIBITION

The provision that breathes life into the ESA and provides the
statute's true muscle is section 9's take prohibition." Section 9 makes
91. Benson & Priestley, supranote 11, at 96.
92. Id. The Bureau provided no explanation why the problem occurred
predominantly in the Pacific Northwest. Id. See also Koberstein, supranote 86, at 1-2.
93. Section 485g directs the Secretary to classify or reclassify "as to irrigability and
productivity those lands which have been, are, or may be included within any project."
Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 43 U.S.C. § 485g (1994).
94. Benson & Priestley, supranote 11, at 96-97.
95. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
96. Id. § 1531(c)(1).
97. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
98. Jason M. Patlis, Recovey, Conservation, and Survival Under the Endangered Species
Act: Recovering Species, Conserving Resources, and Saving the Law, 17 PUB. LAND &
REsoURcEs L. Rzv. 55, 57 (1996). Events in Idaho in October 2000 provide a related
example of the potentially all-encompassing reach of the take prohibition. The Idaho
Watersheds Project and the Committee for Idaho's High Desert mailed 60-day noticeof-intent-to-sue letters to over fifty ranchers, irrigators, and state and federal agencies
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it "unlawful for any person" to "take" any species listed as endangered
under the ESA.9 For threatened species, the Secretary of the Interior
has the discretion to prohibit takings or to issue regulations, called
"4(d) rules," that are "necessary and advisable to provide for the
conservation of [threatened] species. ""' ° The term "take" is broadly
construed to include any action that would "harm" a species.' ' The
Ninth Circuit has determined that "harm" includes habitat destruction
that could result in extinction of a species.0
Although conflicting
statements by the United States Supreme Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon'0 3 arguably undermined the
validity of the Palila holding, the Ninth Circuit has indicated it
interprets that case to be a complete affirmation of Palilabecause "five
Justices affirmed Palilain all respects."' 4
The goals of the ESA are twofold: first to stave off extinction of
species, and second to recover those species. In theory, the ESA strives
to render itself obsolete.'
Several commentators have observed that
although the ESA's requirements for recovery and conservation are
"vague and poorly defined," 6 the section 9 take prohibition
is what
truly saves species. As one commentator stated, "it is no coincidence
that the greatest success stories of the Act involve species that were
that divert water and dry up streams in southern Idaho. See Enviros Threaten Suit Over
Salmon, TMES-NEws (Twin Falls, Idaho), Oct. 8, 2000, at Al, available at
http://www.newslibrary.com/deliverccdoc.asp?SMH=285720.
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1). The listing process is detailed in section 4. Id. § 1533.

100. Id. § 1533(d).
101. The ESA defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. §
1532(19) (1994). See also 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1999), 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2000);
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Definition of "Harm," 63 Fed. Reg.
24,148-49 (May 1, 1998). NMFS modifies FWS's regulation slightly by including
habitat modification that "actually kills or injures fish or wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, spawning, rearing,
migrating, feeding, and sheltering." Id. at 24,149.
102. Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
1988).
103. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 695,
697 (1995) (upholding FWS's inclusion of habitat modification and degradation in
the definition of "harm").
104. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996)
(reaffirming that ESA protects listed species from harm caused by habitat modification
or destruction). While some federal court decisions prior to Sweet Home required a
showing of proximate causation to support a take violation, most, including the Ninth
Circuit's decisions, simply required "but for" causation. Justice Stevens' majority
opinion in Sweet Home acknowledged a split on this issue between the Ninth Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit, and resolved the conflict by reversing the D.C. Circuit, despite
Justice O'Connor's statement in her concurrence that she would have overruled Palila
based on a proximate causation requirement. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 688, 695, 71214. See also Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the
EndangeredSpecies Act, 23 ECOLOGvL.Q. 1, 49-52 (1996).
105. The definition of "conservation" provides for "the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species
to the point at which the measuresprovidedpursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary." 16
U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
106. Patlis, supranote 98, at 57.
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endangered or threatened as a result of takings that were prohibited
by section 9; species that have declined as a result of diffuse impacts
have been much slower to recover."107
B.

THE SECTION 7 CONSULTATION PROCESS

The ESA's other primary mechanism is the section 7 consultation
process." 8 Section 7 prohibits federal agencies from taking actions
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of those species' critical
To achieve this purpose, section 7 outlines a three-step
habitat.'
process for "any action authorized, funded, or carried out" by an
agency after a species is listed."0 First, the action agency must ask
either FWS or NMFS whether any endangered or threatened species
"may be present" in the affected area."' If so, the action agency must
prepare a biological assessment ("BA") to determine whether the
species is "likely to be affected" by the proposed action.12 Finally, if
the BA determines a proposed action is likely to affect a threatened or
endangered species, the action agency must formally consult with FWS
Formal consultation leads to a biological opinion
or NMFS."'
("BiOp") from FWS or NMFS, determining whether the proposed
action will "jeopardize the continued existence of""4 the species or
destroy or adversely modify a critical habitat."5
This section 7 process leads to a substantive result. If FWS or
NMFS makes a jeopardy determination, the proposed action cannot
go forward until the agency introduces mitigation measures that
reduce the adverse impacts of the project to the point of no
jeopardy.16 Even when the BiOp concludes the proposed action
would not jeopardize the species or its critical habitat, FWS or NMFS
107. Patlis, supra note 98, at 57. See also Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act
and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L.
REv. 277, 344-51 (1993).
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1994).
109. Id. § 1536(a) (2).
110. Id. See also Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985).
111. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1).
112. Id. This determination may be part of the environmental assessment ("EA") or
environmental impact statement ("EIS") for the project, under the National
Environmental Policy Act. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4370d (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
113. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (1994).
114. Id. § 1536(a)(4).
115. Id.§ 1536(b) (3) (A).
116. SeeThomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985). In the BiOp, FWS or
NMFS must "suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives ["RPAs"] which [the
Service] believes would not violate [section 7(a) (2)] and can be taken by the Federal
agency... in implementing the agency action." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (3) (A). RPAs are
alternative actions "that can be implemented in a manner consistent with the intended
purpose of the action, ... [and] the scope of the Federal agency's legal authority and
jurisdiction, that is economically and technologically feasible, and that the [Service]
believes would avoid the likelihood of jeopardizing the continued existence of listed
species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000).
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may still suggest mitigation measures." 7 Although the action agency is
not required to adopt those measures, if the agency "deviates from
them, [it] does so subject to the risk that [it] has not satisfied the
standard of section 7(a) (2)."1 8
The end of the consultation process includes two key substantive
requirements. First, section 7 (a) (1) sets out a federal duty to conserve,
stating "[f]ederal agencies shall... utilize their authorities in
furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs
for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species. "" 9
Conservation means using all methods possible-including "research,
census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance,
propagation, live trapping, and transplantation"-to return a species
to the point at which the measures provided in the ESA are no longer
necessary. I12
While the duty to conserve requirement uses the
mandatory word "shall," agencies still retain significant discretion in
terms of what "conservation" entails. 21 However, agency discretion
regarding what conservation steps are necessary to conserve a species is
not unlimited: the agency must at least show it has taken the proper
steps and engaged in a process designed to decide how it will fulfill its
statutory mandate.22 In short, the ESA equates conservation with
117. Thomas, 753 F.2d at 763.
118. Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation
omitted). See also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dept. of the Navy, 898
F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990) ("while consultation with the FWS may have satisfied
the Navy's proceduralobligations under the ESA, the Navy may not rely solely on a FWS
biological opinion to establish conclusively its compliance with its substantive
obligations under section 7(a)(2)"). A recent district court case from Arizona
determined that the Bureau had violated section 9 where a "take" had occurred that
was attributable to a Bureau project. Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt,
Nos. 97-0474 PHX-DAE & 97-1479 PHX-DAE (consolidated), slip op. at 38 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 26, 2000) (on file with author) (order granting in part and denying in part
plaintiff's Motion for SummaryJudgment and defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment). The district court also determined and that the Bureau was not exempt
from the "take" prohibition because the agency had failed to implement the RPAs
from the biological opinion. Id.
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1) (1994). This conservation duty is also explicit in the
ESA's goals, where Congress states that "all Federal departments and agencies shall
seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species." Id. § 1531 (c)(1).
120. Id. § 1532(3) ("the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to
bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary").
121. See, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 26263 (9th Cir. 1984); Pyramid Lake, 898 F.2d at 1418 (stating the "Secretary is to be
afforded some discretion in ascertaining how best to fulfill the mandate to conserve
under section 7(a) (1)"); Paths, supra note 98, at 88-89; Houck, supranote 107, at 32728.
122. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977). The
court stated:
It is clear from the face of the statute that the Fish and Wildlife Service ...
must do far more than merely avoid the elimination of protected species. It
must bring these species back from the brink so that they may be removed
from the protected class, and it must use all methods necessary to do so.
Id. at 170. The Fifth Circuit has elaborated on this requirement, holding that section
7(a) (1) places upon federal agencies a mandatory duty to conserve threatened and
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recovery-agencies must not only prevent jeopardy, but also recover
listed species to the point that ESA protection is no longer needed.
Second, the action agency has an independent duty to comply with
the no jeopardy requirement. Unless the action agency is granted an
incidental "take" exemption,"' section 7(a) (2) requires assurance that
a proposed action "is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat.",2 The test
for a finding ofjeopardy asks whether the action "reasonably would be
expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of
both the survival and recovery of a listed species." 12' Therefore, for the
Bureau's failure to control water spreading to fall within the purview
of section 7, a plaintiff must establish that water spreading amounts to
(1) an "agency action," that (2) "may affect" listed salmon.
V. CONTROLLING WATER SPREADING VIA THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: WATER SPREADING AS AN
"AGENCY ACTION" THAT "MAY AFFECT" LISTED SPECIES
This section examines whether water spreading qualifies as "agency
action" that "may affect" listed salmon. The key to determining
whether the procedural and substantive requirements of the ESA apply
to water spreading lies primarily in examining whether the Bureau's
Section
practices qualify as an "agency action" under the ESA.
7(a) (2) states that agency action is "any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by such agency."128 The regulations provide that section 7's
consultation requirements "apply to all [agency] actions in which
Thus, in
there is discretionary Federal involvement or control."'
order to qualify as "agency action" under the ESA, water spreading
must satisfy three elements: (1) federal agency involvement; (2) an
identifiable action; and (3) discretionary authority.13

endangered species, and that agencies must develop conservation programs for
specific species. Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 617 (5th Cir. 1998).
123. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h).
124. Id. § 1536(a) (2) (emphasis added).
125. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000). See, e.g., Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v.
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 684 F.2d 1041, 1049 (1st Cir. 1982) (consultation
process "is not merely a procedural requirement").
126. A case filed in the District of Oregon includes a claim that the Bureau has
violated section 7(a)(2) "by failing to identify and halt the illegal use of water
delivered from federal water projects in the Columbia and Snake River basins, and by
failing to consult with NMFS on the effects of continued illegal water use on
endangered and threatened anadromous fish." Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 29, Trout Unltd. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 00-262 MA (D.
Or. filed Feb. 22, 2000) (on file with author).
127. See Baker, supra note 16, at 633.
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (1994).
129. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03.
130. See Baker, supra note 16, at 627-28. Some debate surrounds whether the
discretionary element should be included in the definition of agency action. See infra
note 228.
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Courts have construed the term "agency action" broadly.'' The
term includes actions such as Forest Service land resource
management plans,' private actions under a nationwide Army Corps
of Engineers permit," Forest Service approval of private mining
plans, the sale of oil and gas leases on national forests, 35 and federal
dam projects already under construction. ' Prior to the promulgation
of the regulatory definition, the Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill concluded the term "agency action" is
comprehensive.' s The Court stated:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision
whose terms were any plainer than those in [section] 7 of the
Endangered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively command all
federal agencies "to insure that actions authorized,funded, or carried out
by them do not jeopardize the continued existence" of an endangered
species or "result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such
species." This language admits of no exception.
If this broad construction continues and the ESA applies to the
Bureau's failure to control water spreading, the Bureau could be
required to re-assert control over illegally spread water to maintain an
adequate supply for listed salmon.
This section first considers the scope of Bureau actions that courts
have previously held to be "agency actions" under the ESA. The
discussion then turns to an examination of each of the elements of an
agency action and how the Bureau's failure to stop water spreading
satisfies each of those elements. Finally, the section concludes with an
examination of the evidence that water spreading "may affect" listed
salmon.
A.

THE SCOPE OF BUREAU OF RECLAMATION ACTIONS HELD TO BE
"AGENCY ACTIONS"

In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston, the Ninth Circuit
held renewals of federal water delivery contracts constitute "agency
actions" under the ESA, triggering the procedural and substantive
s9 NRDC
requirements of section 7."
and fourteen other environmental
plaintiffs sued the Bureau in 1988, over agency water delivery contract

131. See Baker, supra note 16, at 628.
132. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 1994)
("[T] here is little doubt that Congress intended to enact a broad definition of agency
action in the ESA, and therefore that the [land resource management plans] are
continuing agency action.").
133. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 511 (10th Cir. 1985).
134. Baker v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 928 F. Supp. 1513, 1518 (D. Idaho 1996).
135. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1442-43, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,

489 U.S. 1012 (1989).
136.
137.
138.
139.

Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1978).
Id. at 173.
Id (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998).
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renewals under the Central Valley Project in California, the nation's
largest federal water reclamation project. 4 ' The plaintiffs claimed the
Bureau had violated section 7 by failing to consult with NMFS on the
effects of the contract renewals on endangered Sacramento winter-run
chinook, and by making "irreversible and irretrievable commitment[s]
of resources."14 The district court agreed, ruling the Bureau violated
the ESA by renewing water contracts that amounted to irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources before completing the ESA's
4
formal consultation requirements."
Several irrigation districts appealed, arguing the contract renewals
were not "agency actions" under the ESA because the Bureau had no
discretion to alter the terms of the renewal contracts. 4 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument, noting that regulations broadly define,
144 and courts broadly interpret,'5
the term "agency action." In
addition, federal reclamation law states the government must renew
the contracts on "mutually agreeable" terms, 46 and water rights are
based on the amount of project water available.'4 7 The court also
rejected the irrigation districts' argument that the Bureau lacked
discretion to alter the quantity of water delivered. 4 ' The court cited
O'Neill v. United States49 for the proposition that "an agency can deliver
less than a contractually agreed upon amount of water in order to
comply with subsequently enacted federal law." 15 Thus, the court
determined the Bureau had discretion not only to alter key terms in
the contract, but also to reduce the amount of water to be delivered if
necessary to comply with the ESA.' 5'
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit continued to define broadly the scope
of Bureau "agency actions" under the ESA. 52 In Klamath Water Users
Protective Association v. Patterson, the court held that after entering a
water delivery contract, the Bureau retained control over its dams and
had the legal duty to order dam operations to comply with the ESA
and tribal water rights.13 Irrigators argued they were third-party
140. Id. at 1124. SeeBaker, supra note 16, at 623.
141. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1128. "[I]rreversible and irretrievable commitment[s] of
resources" are prohibited by section 7(d). 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1994).
142. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1128.
143. Id. at 1125.
144. 50 C.F.R1 § 402.02 (2000) ("Action means all activities or programs of any kind
authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies....
Examples include, but are not limited to... the granting of licenses, contracts, leases,
easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid.").
145. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1125 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173
(1978); Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1994)).
146. 43 U.S.C. § 485h-1(1) (1994).
147. See id. § 485h-1 (4).
148. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1125-26.
149. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995).
150. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1126.
151. Id.
152. PattersonII, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000).
153. Id. The agency action in this case is the Bureau's management of the dam.
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beneficiaries to a contract between the Bureau and California Oregon
Power Company ("Copco"), which operated the dam and stored water
for delivery under the contract at issue.
The irrigators claimed, as
third-party beneficiaries to a contract made for their direct benefit,
they were entitled to enforce the contract's terms.' 5 Rejecting this
argument, the Ninth Circuit determined:
Although the Contract operates to the Irrigators'

benefit by

impounding irrigation water, and was undoubtedly entered into with
the Irrigators in mind, to allow them intended third-party beneficiary
status would open the door to all users receiving a benefit from the
Project achieving similar status, a result not intended by the
Contract.

The court also determined the contract unmistakably gives the
Bureau-not the dam operator-control over the dam."' Finally, as a
federal agency, the Bureau retains authority over the dam, with
responsibility and authority to direct dam operations in compliance
with the ESA and tribal water rights. This Bureau management of dam
operations is "agency action" under ESA section 7. 58 Thus, the
Bureau had discretionary authority, subject to the ESA, to establish a
new operating plan for the dam, requiring the dam operator to modify
flows to lower levels than called for under the operator's license with
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.'59
Whether water spreading qualifies as "agency action" under the
ESA, therefore, is framed with the preceding cases in mind. In order
to qualify as "agency action" under the ESA, water spreading must
satisfy the following three elements: federal agency involvement, an
identifiable action, and discretionary authority.

154. Id. at 1209. The United States and Copco entered into the initial fifty-year
contract in 1917, pursuant to the Reclamation Act. Id. Under the contract, Copco
would construct the dam and then convey it to the federal government. Id. In 1956,
the parties renewed the contract for a new fifty-year term. Id. Although the court
does not specify, it probably referred to the terms as fifty-year terms rather than fortyyear terms because it combined the ten-year "development" period with the forty-year
"long-term contract" period. See 43 U.S.C. § 485h(d), (e) (1994). See also supra note
27.
155. Patterson II, 204 F.3d at 1210. In 1992, FWS issued a BiOp that required
minimum elevations for Upper Klamath Lake to avoid jeopardizing the Lost River and
shortnose suckers. Id. at 1209. In addition, the Secretary of Interior recognized that
the Klamath, Yurok, and Hoopa Tribes held treaty fishing and water rights in the
basin. Id. In response to these obligations, the Bureau established a new operating
plan for the dam, which called for Copco to operate the dam at decreased flow levels.
Id. at 1209-10.
156. Id. at 1212.
157. Id. at 1212-13. The contract directs the dam operator to operate and maintain
the dam at certain water levels, and states that the Bureau may override the operator's
decisions. Id. at 1213.
158. PattersonII, 204 F.3d at 1213.
159. See icL at 1209-10.
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B.

FEDERAL AGENCY INVOLVEMENT IN WATER SPREADING

ESA regulations define "Federal agency" as "any department,
agency or instrumentality of the United States."' 60 Section 7(a)(1)
directs federal agencies to "utilize their authorities in furtherance of
the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the
conservation of endangered species and threatened species." 6"
Section 7(a) (2) prohibitions on actions likely to jeopardize existence
of an endangered species include not only activities undertaken
directly by federal agencies, but also nonfederal actions involving
federal authorization or assistance. Of the three elements of agency
action, federal agency involvement is the easiest to establish. Although
water spreading generally occurs on private or leased lands, the water
applied is federal project water, developed under the reclamation laws.
In addition, administration of reclamation laws requires the Bureau to
develop and maintain federal reclamation
projects, producing water
62
that is ultimately illegally applied.
Two related counter-arguments might suggest that no federal
agency involvement exists with respect to water spreading.'6 3 First, one
may argue that delivery organizations such as water users associations
and irrigation districts-and not the Bureau-are actually delivering
water, so that the federal government has not "authorized, funded, or
carried out" illegal use of the water.'4 However, this argument fails
because the Bureau in countless instances delivers water to irrigation
districts well aware that some of that water is not used according to the
contract terms, and fails to stop the practice. 65 There is no question
that the Bureau is fully aware of water spreading practices throughout
its Pacific Northwest Region; the Bureau first formally recognized the
extent of waterspreading in 1983266 This situation provides a classic
example of an agency "authorizing" a practice by continuing to deliver
water under existing contracts, despite full cognizance of illegal
spreading of federally developed water. Authorization, of course, is
included in the definition of agency action.
A second closely related counter-argument suggests that individual
irrigators, not the Bureau, do the actual water spreading, with even
160. 50 C.F.R. § 450.01 (2000).
161. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1) (1994).
162. See, e.g., Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 373 (1994) (general authority of
Secretary of the Interior to carry out reclamation laws). See also discussion infra Part
V.C.I.a (Bureau duties under reclamation laws).
163. One may also frame these arguments in terms of the "identifiable action"
element of the agency action analysis. These arguments suggest that although a
federal agency is involved in the use of federal project water, the action of water
spreading itself is not undertaken by the federal agency. However, the federal "action"
with respect to water spreading is actually the Bureau's failure to act to control the
problem. See discussion infra Part V.C.
164. See Baker, supra note 16, at 633 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (1994)).
165. Id.
166. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAND
CLASSIFICATION AND EQUIVALENCY, 10-11 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 BuREAu LAND
CLASSIFICATION AND EQUIVALENCY REPORT].
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more tangential agency involvement than in the preceding
permutation of the argument. Again, although a private individual is
illegally using federal project water, the practice includes federal
involvement. Here, the Bureau authorizes project water use while fully
aware of the user's failure to comply with terms of water delivery
contracts and reclamation laws, and thus allows the practice to
continue by allowing continued water deliveries. This situation is
analogous to the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") failing to
control (and therefore "authorizing") nonpoint source water pollution
from livestock grazing on public lands. The BLM frequently fails to act
when individual ranchers with permits allow livestock to graze near
and in streams, resulting in nonpoint source pollution and water
quality standards violations expressly prohibited by the Clean Water
Act's federal facilities provision.
Similarly, federal agency
involvement (and action) in the BLM context occurs when BLM issues
or renews a federal grazing permit, fully aware that the resulting
nonpoint source pollution may violate the agency's duty to comply
with state water quality standards.1'6
C. THE IDENTIFIABLE AGENCY ACTION IN WATER SPREADING
ESA regulations define federal agency action as "all activities or
programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or
in part, by Federal agencies."1 69 Examples "include, but are not limited
to... the granting of licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-ofway, permits, or grants-in-aid; or... actions directly or indirectly
causing modifications to the land, water, or air."170 A number of
identifiable Bureau "actions" relate to water spreading, including the
Bureau's failure to stop the illegal practice (that is, inaction as action),
actual Bureau water deliveries, and water delivery contract renewals.
1.

Inaction as Agency Action: The Bureau's Duty to Act to Control
Water Spreading

The most readily identifiable Bureau action with respect to water
spreading involves the agency's failure to act. Failure to stop water
spreading is tantamount to the Bureau "authorizing" illegal use of

167. See Peter M. Lacy, Addressing Water Pollutionfrom Livestock GrazingAfter ONDA v.
Dombeck: Legal Strategies Under the Clean Water Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 617, 665 (2000).
Section 313, the Clean Water Act's federal facilities provision, states:
Each [federal agency] (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or
(2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge or
runoff of pollutants... shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and
process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water
pollution.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1994).
168. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
169. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02(c), (d) (2000).
170. Id.
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project water.'
The Bureau's failure to stop water spreading also
qualifies as action that directly or indirectly causes modification to the
land, water, or air."2 Inaction by itself, however, is not enough.
Although the Bureau remains aware of the practice and has not acted
to control the problem, for inaction to be agency action that triggers
the requirements of section 7(a) (2), there must be an underlying duty
to act.'3 Thus, where agency action is actually a failure to act,7 there
4
must be a duty to act, coupled with discretionary authority to act.
This inaction, as "identifiable action" with respect to water
spreading, is analogous to an agency's "failure to act" in the context of
the Administrative Procedure Act.
Inaction as action is also well
established in the context of the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA").176 For example, in 1996, the Ninth Circuit held the
Secretary of Commerce's failure to disapprove harvest management
plans prepared by the North Pacific Fish Management Council
("Council") 177 was a major federal action for NEPA purposes'
Under
the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the Secretary of Commerce must review
harvest plans issued by the Council to ensure the plans comply with

171. See, e.g., Baker, supranote 16, at 633.
172. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
173. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 445 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to the
Secretary's mandatory obligation, i.e., duty, under Magnuson-Stevens Act to review
harvest management plans prepared by North Pacific Fish Management Council);
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Comm'r, Food & Drug Admin., 740 F.2d 21,
32 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("When agency recalcitrance is in the face of a clear statutory duty or
is of such magnitude that it amounts to an abdication of statutory responsibility, the
court has the power to order the agency to act to carry out its substantive statutory
mandates.") (emphasis added); Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 937 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir.
1991) ("Administrative agencies do not possess the discretion to avoid discharging the
duties that Congress intended them to perform.").
174. That is, there must be a duty, coupled with some discretionary authority or
authorities the Bureau can exercise in order to satisfy the obligations imposed by its
duty to act. Part V.D infra discusses the Bureau's discretionary authorities with respect
to water spreading.
175. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") defines "agency action" as
"includ[ing] the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or
the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1994) (emphasis
added). See, e.g., Florida Keys Citizens Coalition v. West, 996 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (S.D.
Fla. 1998) (holding reviewable under the APA the Army Corps of Engineers' failure to
maintain records of wetland acreage loss, failure to consult with FWS and NMFS, and
failure to consider secondary and cumulative impacts of applications for permits in the
East Everglades and Florida Keys wetlands).
176. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2000) ("Actions include the circumstance where the
responsible officials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable by courts or
administrative tribunals under the [APA] or other applicable law as agency action.").
177. The North Pacific Fish Management Council is one of eight councils
established under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which authorizes creation of the
councils under the Secretary of Commerce and requires the councils to develop fish
management plans that cover anadromous fish while they are in the ocean. Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998). The North Pacific Fishery Management Council oversees ocean fishing for
salmon in the Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea, and Pacific Ocean off of Alaska. Id. §
1852(a) (7).
178. Ramsey, 96 F.3d at 445.
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federal requirements-thus imposing a duty to act.'7 9 If the Secretary
does not disapprove of a plan, the plan takes effect.' 0 In that case,
although the Secretary had delegated authority over the ocean
harvests to Alaska since 1990, the Secretary retained the duty to review
the plans. 8 ' Because the Secretary did not disapprove the plans, they
became law.'82 Holding the district court erred when it concluded an
EIS was not required before the ocean salmon fishing under the plan
occurred, the Ninth Circuit stated "[i]t is clear from federal
regulations that federal inaction can count as federal action for
purposes of triggering the EIS requirement under NEPA." 8 The
court concluded the "Secretary's mandatory obligation to review the
plans prepared by the council or its delegate ... suffices to make his
failure to disapprove [a] major federal action. " '
With respect to water spreading, the Bureau has clearly
acknowledged the widespread occurrence of illegal water spreading,
but has failed to take any actions to stop the practice. Again, however,
it is not enough that the Bureau simply is aware of the practice of water
spreading and has not acted to control the problem. For inaction to
constitute an agency action that triggers the requirements of section
7(a) (2), the statute also requires an underlying duty to act, coupled
with the discretionary authority to act. There are three main sources
for the Bureau's affirmative duties to control water spreading: the
reclamation laws, subsequently enacted federal environmental laws,
and senior tribal water rights.
a.

Duties Under the Reclamation Laws

The reclamation laws, which regulate the development and use of
federal project water, guide the Bureau in its primary duties. 8 5 The
Bureau has developed the Reclamation program over the past century
pursuant to the authority of those laws. Chief among these duties is
the restriction on the use of federal project water. Section 383 of the
Reclamation Act states that the Secretary shall carry out the
reclamation program in conformance with state laws:

179. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (1) (B) (1994) (after receiving a plan from the Council, the
Secretary "shall... immediately commence a review of the management plan.., to
determine whether it is consistent with the national standards ... and any other
applicable law").
180. Id. § 1854(b)(1)(A)-(B).
181. Ramsey, 96 F.3d at 445.

182. Id.
183. Id. (citing NEPA regulations at 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18).
184. Id.
185. The generally applicable reclamation laws, including the Reclamation Act of
1902, the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, and the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982,
appear at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-573 (1994). The term "reclamation laws" also refers to
project authorizing acts and other statutes affecting individual projects. Note also that
in specific project authorizations, Congress may exempt a particular project from one
or more of the generally applicable reclamation laws. See Benson, Whose Water Is It',
supranote 61, at 417 & n.315.
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Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or
intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State
or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired
thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the
provisions of this Act, shallproceed in conformity with such laws.

Further, section 372 states "[t]he right to the use of water acquired
under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land
irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of
the right."'8 7 In other words, the Reclamation Act obligates the Bureau
to fulfill a duty to provide water to users only if the agency insures the
project water rights are appurtenant to the land irrigated, and the use
of project water pursuant to those rights is limited to "beneficial use,"
and conforms to state laws.
In 1978, the Supreme Court interpreted section 383 to obligate the
Bureau to observe state law except to the extent that state law conflicts
directly with a specific provision of the federal reclamation laws.'
Following that precedent, the Ninth Circuit has determined the
Reclamation Act requires the Bureau to defer to state law for purposes
of determining beneficial use. The Ninth Circuit noted the "United
States' interest in the determination of a user's water duty, as declared89
by the statute, is to see that beneficial use is its measure and limit."
Therefore, although the Bureau itself does not determine what is a
beneficial use, it has the duty to ensure federal project water deliveries
are limited to beneficial use as defined under the state law applicable
to a particular project. As applied to water spreading, the Bureau must
assure that use of project water does not exceed the beneficial use with
respect to irrigation. Because beneficial use is one part of an
appropriative water right, the Bureau may, for example, fail to ensure
that project water deliveries are limited to beneficial use by allowing an
irrigator to irrigate lands not described in her water right.'90 The
Bureau's failure to stop the water spreading in this instance is an
"action" based on the Bureau's affirmative duty under the reclamation
laws.
In addition to the Bureau's duty to ensure that the application of
project water is limited to beneficial use, the Bureau also has a duty
under the reclamation laws to classify irrigable lands within each new
project.' This obligation elucidates a duty to ensure water is delivered
186. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (emphasis added).
187. Id. § 372 (emphasis added).
188. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 672 n.25 (1978) ("specific
congressional directives which were contrary to state law regulating distribution of
water would override that law").
189. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 856 n.3 (9th Cir.
1983). SeeBenson, Whose Water Is It ?, supra note 61, at 418.
190. Recall, as is emphasized in section 372, that an appropriation is appurtenant to
the land on which it is used, i.e. the land specified in the water permit or certificate.
See also Howitt, supranote 18, at 258-62.
191. 43 U.S.C. § 462 ("irrigable lands of each new project and new division of a
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only to those lands classified as irrigable.'9 2 Irrigation districts also are
prohibited from delivering water to irrigators not eligible to receive
project water "under the certification or reporting requirements or
any other provision of Federal reclamation law."'
Related to this
obligation is the requirement that project water may not be delivered
for irrigation of lands held in excess of the acreage limitations 94
imposed by the reclamation laws "unless and until the owners thereof
shall have executed a recordable contract with the Secretary...
requiring the disposal of their interest in such excess lands within a
reasonable time." - In addition, the Bureau has a duty to fulfill its
contractual responsibilities, unless overridden by subsequently enacted
legislation.'" In the water spreading context, the Bureau cannot
"authorize" water deliveries to lands not classified as eligible to receive
project water and must hold its users to irrigation of only those acres
for which they have contracted, either with the Bureau directly or with
the water delivery organization.
b.

Duty With Respect to Subsequent Acts of Congress: Endangered
Species Act
The Bureau also has a duty to comply with subsequently enacted

project approved ... shall be classified by the Secretary with respect to their power.., to
support a family and pay water charges") (emphasis added). Also, irrigators or water
delivery organizations may request the Secretary to classify or reclassify lands "as to
irrigability and productivity." Id. § 485g(a). The reclamation laws require that
"[u] pon receipt of any such request the Secretary shall make a preliminary determination
whether the requested land classification or reclassification probably is justified," and
"[i]f the Secretary finds probable justification.., he shall undertake as soon as
practicable the classification or reclassification." Id. § 485g(d)-(e) (emphasis added).
192. Irrigable land means "land so classified by Reclamation under a specific project
plan for which irrigation water is, can be, or is planned to be provided, and for which
facilities necessary for sustained irrigation are provided or are planned to be
provided." 43 C.F.R. 426.2 (2000).
193. 43 C.F.R. § 426.19(h).
194. The 1902 Reclamation Act originally limited water delivery for irrigation to no
more than 160 acres of land. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1994) ("No right to the use of waterfor land
in private ownership shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any
one landowner, and no such sale shall be made to any landowner unless he be an
actual bona fide resident on such land.") (emphasis added). The Reclamation
Reform Act of 1982 increased that number to 960 acres. Id. § 390dd(1).
195. Id.§ 390ii(a).
196. See Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supra note 61, at 420. See, e.g., Barcellos &
Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 849 F. Supp. 717, 731 (E.D. Cal. 1993), affid sub
nom. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995). The district court in
Barcellos stated that the government is not required "to continue to deliver water in
contravention of the water delivery contract, which defines the extent of the water
right. The disputed contract grants specified water rights. The government is
prohibited from breaching the terms of the contract." Id. The Ninth Circuit in O'Neill
affirmed and added that "[e]ven if the water service contract did obligate the
government to supply, without exception, 900,000 acre-feet of water, the district court
correctly held that Area I [users] would still not be entitled to prevail as the contract is
not immune from subsequently enacted statutes." 50 F.3d at 686. For further detail
on the ONeill case and the effect of subsequently enacted statutes, see infra notes 20307 and the accompanying text.
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federal environmental laws, including the ESA.'97 For example, the
Ninth Circuit upheld a Bureau decision to operate a project for the
benefit of listed fish and not to sell project water for municipal and
The court in that case affirmed the Bureau's
industrial purposes.'
duty to conserve listed species under the ESA, concluding section
7(a) (1) of the ESA requires the Bureau to "actively pursue a species
Similarly, the Bureau must comply with
conservation policy." l'
and environmental impact
NEPA's environmental
200 assessment
•
statement requirements.
Closely related to this duty is the Bureau's obligation to modify an
existing contract when a subsequent act of Congress requires some
change in contract terms2 0 1 The only exception is where a contract
"surrender[s] in unmistakable terms" Congress's "ability to amend,
alter or repeal the provisions of the Reclamation Act" and enact
subsequent legislation affecting the government's contractual
With respect to
arrangements under the reclamation laws.022
act in the
congressional
subsequent
is
a
there
salmon,
endangered
with
consult
Bureau
the
that
requirement
7
section
form of the ESA's
the
to
jeopardize
likely
not
are
actions
agency
federal
NMFS to ensure
modify
adversely
or
destroy
or
continued existence of listed species,
those species' critical habitat.
In O'Neill v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held the Bureau could
deliver less than the contractually agreed upon amount of water to
contract holders in California, in order to comply with subsequently
enacted federal law. °3 In that case, the Bureau could not deliver the
full contractual amount of water consistently with provisions of the
Central Valley Project Improvement Act ("CVPIA") 20 -and the ESA. In
order to supply project water for fish and wildlife, the CVPIA mandates
that the Bureau provide 800,000 acre-feet (or roughly ten percent) of
Central Valley Project water annually to wildlife refuges, instream uses,
and instream flows.205 When NMFS issued a biological opinion stating
operation of the Central Valley Project, as proposed in 1993, was likely
to jeopardize Sacramento winter-run chinook salmon, the Bureau
197. See Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supra note 61, at 420-22.
198. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 259-60 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985).
199. Id. at 262.
200. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Duvall, 777 F. Supp. 1533, 1534 (E.D. Cal.
1991) (EIS required for rules to implement the reclamation program); Envtl. Def.
Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1979) (EIS required when water is
committed to a particular use through a water marketing program or contract).
201. See William H. Holmes & Gail L. Achterman, Bureau of Reclamation Contract
Renewal and Administration: When Is a Contract Not a Contract?, 41 ROcMY MTN.MIN. L.
INST. 23-1, 23-27 (1995).
202. Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 808 (9th Cir. 1990).
203. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995).
204. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-575, 106 Stat. 4600, 4706 (1992) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390h to 390h-16 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) & 16 U.S.C. 4600-31 to -34 (1994)).
205. 106 Stat. at 4715-16.
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announced that, to comply with the mandates of the CVPIA and the
ESA, it would reduce its initial allocation of water to several contract
holders by fifty percent.206 The Ninth Circuit upheld the Bureau's
reallocation of water by adhering to a long-established doctrine that
supports subsequent revisions of contracts between the federal
government and private parties unless the2 7 government has
unequivocally surrendered its sovereign authority.
In the water-spreading context, section 7 of the ESA is a
subsequent congressional act requiring the Bureau to consult with
NMFS to ensure that federal agency actions are not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of listed salmon species, or destroy or
adversely modify those species' critical habitat. Just as the Ninth
Circuit in O'Neil affirmed the Bureau's decision to satisfy its duties
under the CVPIA and the ESA by reducing water deliveries, the
Bureau must also satisfy its section 7 duty to consult with NMFS on the
effects of water spreading on listed salmon. That is, the ESA requires
the Bureau to consult on its actions where, for example, the Bureau
has affirmative, on-going obligations under the reclamation laws such
as the duty to ensure that water is delivered only to lands classified as
irrigable.
c.

Duty With Respect to Senior Tribal Water Rights

Finally, the Bureau has a duty to control water spreading in such a
way as to fulfill the federal government's trust obligation to Indian
tribes. Indian tribes have two discrete and vitally important salmonrelated rights in the Columbia Basin: the right to take fish and a timeimmemorial water right. The federal-tribal trust relationship, whose
principles are often traced back to the Supreme Court's 1831 ruling in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,28 recognizes the sovereignty of Indian
nations runs concurrent with a federal fiduciary duty to Indian tribes.
This federal fiduciary obligation includes protection of the treatysecured fishing rights of the Pacific Northwest tribes. The "Stevens
treaty tribes"219 of the Columbia Basin were assured the right of "taking
fish" at all "usual and accustomed" places "in common with" EuroAmerican settlers. '0 This treaty language was interpreted by Judge
Belloni in the District of Oregon to mean a "fair share" of the

206. Baker, supranote 16, at 629.
207. O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 686. See also Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation & Drainage Dist.
v. United States, 158 F.3d 428, 438 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Because we are wary of
constructions that would give government contracts the force of indelible laws, we
assume that '[t] he sovereign's power to enact subsequent legislation affecting its own
contractual arrangements endures, albeit with some limitations, unless surrendered in
unmistakable terms.'") (citation omitted).
208. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 2, 15-16, 19-20 (1831)
(dismissing case brought by Cherokee Nation against state of Georgia for lack of
original jurisdiction, and recognizing tribes as "domestic dependent nations").
209. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
210. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 331-32 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
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harvest,2 ' and then clarified by Judge Boldt in the Western District of
2
Washington to mean fifty percent of the harvestable salmon.
The fishing rights decisions are integrally tied to Indian water
rights in the Columbia Basin. Because of their unique sovereign
status, Indian tribes are not subject to state prior appropriation laws in
the same way as other western water users, causing a continuing
conflict between Indian tribes and the Bureau.213 Because of the
Indians' unique relationship with state and federal government,
federal courts developed a separate water law doctrine for Indian
tribes, known as the Winans Doctrine. In the 1905 case for which the
doctrine is named, the Supreme Court held the treaties with the
Columbia Basin Indians recognized tribal property rights in offreservation fishing grounds, regardless of state licenses or federal
homestead patents. ' Thus, rather than simply affording the Indian
tribes equal treatment with non-Indians, the tribes had secured a
perpetual servitude in the land that bound the federal government
despite future ownership of the land.
In short, the Indians tribes' physical access to their traditional
fishing places, coupled with the opportunity to take half of the
harvestable salmon, secured powerful and meaningful rights for the
tribes. The federal government has a duty to protect these rights,
which extends to the actions of the Bureau. In Klamath Water Users
Protective Association v. Patterson, the Ninth Circuit wrote, "[s] imilar to
its duties under the ESA, the United States, as a trustee for the Tribes,
has a responsibility to protect their rights and resources."21 5 Because
2 6
the Klamath Basin Tribes hold a "priority date of time immemorial,"
the Bureau, as controller of reclamation project dams, "has a
responsibility to divert the water and resources needed to fulfill the
Tribes' rights, rights that take precedence over any alleged rights of
the Irrigators."21 7 Thus, the court held the Bureau also has the duty to
1
If
direct dam operations to comply with tribal water requirements.

211. Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911 (D. Or. 1969).
212. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 343. For a detailed historical and legal discussion
of the Belloni and Boldt decisions, see Blumm, supra note 17, at 90-98.
213. JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL C. McCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN:
POWER AND PERFORMANCE AMONG NATURAL RESOURCE AGENCIES 143 (2d ed. 1996).
Indeed, from the Bureau's very first project in Nevada, and continuing to the present
day, Bureau projects have clashed with tribal rights across the West. Id.
214. United States v. Winans, 73 F. 72, 75 (C.C.D. Wash. 1896). See also Blumm,
supranote 17, at 81-83.
215. PattersonII, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000).
216. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding Klamath
Basin Tribes hold implied water rights to support hunting and fishing rights
guaranteed by treaties).
217. PattersonII, 204 F.3d at 1214.
218. Id. Note the court's exact language:
Because Reclamation maintains control of the Dam, it has a responsibility to
divert the water and resources needed to fulfill the Tribes' rights, rights that
take precedence over any alleged rights of the Irrigators. Accordingly, we
hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Reclamation has
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the Bureau has an obligation to direct dam project operations in order
to comply with tribal water rights, then it is no great leap in logic to
assume the Bureau has the same obligation to control illegal water
spreading that infringes upon senior tribal water rights-especially if
those water rights are quantified.
In sum, the Bureau's failure to control water spreading of federal
project water-that is, the Bureau's inaction with respect to water
spreading-is an "action" subject to the procedural and substantive
requirements of section 7(a) (2). This "action" is coupled with three
distinct, affirmative duties which the Bureau is obligated to fulfill:
duties under the reclamation laws, duties under subsequently enacted
federal environmental laws, and duties with respect to the federaltribal trust relationship.
2.

Other Identifiable Actions Involving Water Spreading

Besides interpreting the Bureau's failure to act as an action, there
are other "positive" actions involved. Combined with the inaction
described above, the Bureau delivers water or renews contracts with
the knowledge that users are illegally spreading project water.
Knowledge of illegality by itself is not an action, but here, knowledge
coupled with water delivery or contract renewal is. Because the federal
reclamation laws, which are incorporated into any Bureau contract
with an irrigator or delivery organization, allow only specifically
authorized uses of project water, the term "action" subsumes the
Bureau's failure to stop illegal water spreading when the agency
delivers water or renews contracts.
a.

Bureau Water Deliveries

Courts have not yet decided the question of whether a Bureau
water delivery under an existing contract is an agency action. Some
commentators, however, have argued that it clearly falls under the
purview of section 7.V'9 In Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, the Ninth
Circuit held section 7 applies to ongoing agency actions such as the
land resource management plans ("LRMPs") in question! ° Even
though the chinook salmon at issue in Pacfic Rivers Councilwere listed
after the Forest Service had adopted the LRMPs, the court held the
the authority to direct operation of the Dam to comply with Tribal water
requirements.
Id. (emphasis added). Although the court states that the Bureau has the "authority" to
direct dam operations to comply with tribal water requirements, this clearly means a
duty to comply with those requirements. This reading is evident from the preceding
sentence where the court refers to the Bureau's "responsibility" to fulfill the federal
government's trust obligation, as well as the district court opinion the Ninth Circuit
affirms. The district court stated the irrigators' "rights to water in the basin... are
subservient to senior tribal water rights and to subsequent legislative enactments by
Congress, such as the Endangered Species Act." Patterson1, 15 F. Supp. 2d 990, 996
(D. Or. 1998).
219. See Baker, supra note 16, at 634-37.
220. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054-56 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Forest Service still was required to consult with NMFS on the effects of
The Ninth Circuit
the LRMPs once the salmon were listed.22
action "because
agency
ongoing
emphasized that the LRMPs represent
even after
effect
the LRMPs have an ongoing and long-lasting
" 2 LRMPs are analogous to the Bureau's delivery of project
adoption.
water in that water delivery contracts set annual schedules for specified
quantities to be delivered for periods of up to forty years.22 Because
these forty-year contracts specify water delivery quantities, "subsequent
species listings may trigger consultation duties224long after the contracts
are entered into and long before they expire."
b.

Bureau Water Delivery Contract Renewals

Similarly, water delivery contract renewals are "actions" that,
combined with Bureau acknowledgement of illegal water spreading
within the contract area, may subject water spreading to the
requirements of section 7. The Ninth Circuit held in NaturalResources
Defense Council v. Houston that renewals of federal water delivery
225
Although the court's "agency action"
contracts are agency actions.
analysis focused on the discretionary authority element, contract
renewals are obviously "activities or programs of any kind authorized,
funded, or carried out" by the Bureau.226 Indeed, the regulatory
definition of "action" includes "the granting of... contracts."22 To
include water spreading as part of the action of contract renewal, one
must demonstrate the Bureau renewed a contract at the same time it
failed to control illegal water spreading in the contract area. Because
the Bureau is bound by several affirmative duties under the
reclamation laws, including, for example, the agency's obligation to
ensure the appurtenancy and beneficial use requirements are met, a
contract renewal can be an agency action that subsumes the Bureau's
failure to control illegal water spreading.
221. Id. at 1056.
222. Id. at 1053.
223. Baker, supranote 16, at 635.
224. Id. Note also that the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra
Club does not appear to affect this analysis. That case held that a generic challenge to
a forest plan, without any specific or concrete harm alleged, was not ripe for
adjudication. Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 736-37 (1998).
However, the Court did state that harm- or site-specific challenges could include "a
challenge to the lawfulness of the present [forest] Plan if (but only if) the present Plan
then matters, i.e., if the Plan plays a causal role with respect to the future, thenimminent, harm." Id. at 734. The Court also noted that an LRMP would be subject to
challenge upon issuance if the plan "incorporated a final decision" that "could result
in imminent concrete injury," such as to allow motorcycles into a bird-watching area.
Id. at 738-39 (citation omitted). The water spreading that occurs under an existing
water delivery contract is analogous to the situation envisioned by the Court in which
the contract sets forth actual, specific decisions (as opposed to policies or broad
statements of intended actions) that could give rise to imminent harm if violated by
the practice of water spreading.
225. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1998).
226. Id.; 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000).
227. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
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FEDERAL DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO CONTROL WATER
SPREADING

In addition to federal agency involvement and an identifiable
action, the Bureau must possess discretionary authority over an
"agency action." The Ninth Circuit affirmed a regulation
that states
the ESA does not apply when the agency lacks discretion to act for the
benefit of the species, because if the agency "lacks the discretion to
influence the private action, consultation would be a meaningless
exercise. " 28 The Bureau clearly has the discretionary authority to stop
illegal water spreading for the benefit of protected species. According
to Houston, the Bureau's water delivery contracts satisfy this
requirement because the Bureau retains discretionary authority when
it renews a contract with a delivery organization such as a water users
association or irrigation district.!
Under Patterson II, the Bureau
retains the authority to control its dams, making dam operations and
water delivery to irrigators subservient to ESA and senior tribal water
rights considerations. "
Similarly, the Bureau retains the discretionary authority to control
water spreading. This authority stems from a number of different
sources, ranging from the Bureau's authority to administer and
enforce the reclamation laws, 3' to promulgate regulations,2 ' and to
enforce contract provisions.233 The premise that the Bureau has the
responsibility and obligation to properly carry out the reclamation laws
and to stop practices that are illegal under those laws underlies each
source of Bureau discretionary authority to assert control over illegally
spread water and to stop water spreading.

228. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1508-09 (9th Cir. 1995). See 50 C.F.R. §
402.03 ("discretionary Federal involvement or control"); see also Strahan v. Linnon,
967 F. Supp. 581, 607 (D. Mass. 1997) ("[i]f the federal agency has no discretion to
modify the activity at issue to accommodate the mandate of the ESA, then the
consultation process would be pointless") (citation omitted).
Note that these
statements are not uncontroversial.
See Derek Weller, Limiting the Scope of the
EndangeredSpecies Act: DiscretionaryFederalInvolvement or Control Under Section 402.03, 5
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'y 309, 310-11 (1999). Both the statute and the
regulations appear to define "agency action" broadly. The statute defines the term as
"any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter
in this
section referred to as an 'agency action')." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). The
regulations define the term as "all activities or programs of any kind authorized,
funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies." 50 C.F.R1 § 402.02.
However, the regulations add an additional element to the definition by stating that
the requirements of section 7 "apply to all actions in which there is discretionary

Federal involvement or control." Id. § 402.03. Weller argues that section 402.03

effectively redefines the scope of an "agency action" by excluding any actions that can
be deemed nondiscretionary. Weller, supra at 310. Nevertheless, courts have generally
accepted this third element of "agency action" without question.
229. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1126.
230. PattersonII, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2000).
231. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 373 (1994).
232. See id. §§ 373, 390ww(c), 485i.
233. See id §§ 485h-1 to -6.
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1. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations
First and foremost, the Bureau may promulgate regulations
regarding the use of unauthorized water and the procedures the
agency will use to exert its authority and secure control of illegally
used water."" The Reclamation Act authorizes the Secretary of
Interior "to perform any and all acts and to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying
235 Most
out the provisions of this Act into full force and effect."
individual reclamation contracts also recognize the Bureau's authority
to promulgate regulations. 36 Nevertheless, the Bureau has never
promulgated regulations regarding water spreading. Certainly the
Bureau has the authority to make and enforce rules that address and
eliminate such an insidious practice which runs against clear
restrictions in the reclamation laws.
One obvious potential rule would simply direct that a user found
spreading project water to lands not authorized to receive such water
37
would lose the right to continue to receive that quantity of water.
Recognizing that project water "would not exist but for the fact that it
has been developed by the United States," the Ninth Circuit has stated
that project water "is not there for the taking (by the landowner
subject to state law), but for the giving by the United States. The terms
upon which it can be put to use, and the manner in which rights to
238
United States to fix."
continued use can be acquired, are for the

Thus, the Bureau could promulgate a regulation such as the one
suggested, and include it as a delivery contract term and condition.
2.

Authority to Attach Conditions to Delivery of Water

As the Ninth Circuit suggested in Israel v. Morton, the Bureau has
the authority, regardless of whether there is an explicit administrative
rule, to attach conditions to the delivery of the publicly subsidized,
federal benefit that it provides to water users.239 In 1958, the Supreme
Court held in Ivanhoe IrrigationDistrict v. McCracken that because the
United States had expended public funds to develop reclamation
projects, the Bureau could place conditions on receipt of project
benefits. 24 The Court stated it was "beyond challenge" that the federal
government could impose reasonable conditions "on the use of
federal funds, federal property, and federal privileges.... [T]he
Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions
relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives

234. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 105-06.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

43 U.S.C. § 373.
Benson & Priestley, supranote 11, at 105-06.
Id. at 108.
Israel v. Morton, 549 F.2d 128, 132-33 (9th Cir. 1977).
Benson, Whose WaterIs It?, supra note 61, at 411.
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-96 (1958).
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thereof."24" '
As with water delivery, the Bureau retains the authority to change
the terms and conditions for receipt of project water.24 ' The Ninth
Circuit has upheld this authority in the context of applying the
provisions of the 1982 Reclamation Reform Act, 24 renegotiating water

service contracts to increase district payment obligations,N4 and
reallocating project water to meet instream needs, such as protecting
fish. 45 Of course, a fine line exists between a simple change in federal
policy and upsetting reasonably based expectations and interests in
federal water deliveries.4
3.

Authority to Allocate Water Among Eligible Users and Withhold
Water From Projects

The Bureau also holds the authority to allocate water among
otherwise eligible users.247 These discretionary allocation decisions
include determining how project water should be allocated among
different authorized purposes, such as municipal versus irrigation
uses,
allocation during drought conditions, and allocation for
prioritized tribal and environmental needs.250 In addition to the
authority to allocate, the Bureau also has the authority to withhold
water from projects for a variety of reasons,25' including water users'
failure to meet federal reporting requirements, 252 violation of projectspecific water use regulations, lack of a contractual right to receive
water, 254 or an unreasonable waste of project water. 255

The Bureau's

241. Id. at 295.
242. Benson, Whose WaterIs It?, supranote 61, at 413.
243. See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 821-25
(9th Cir. 1990); Peterson v. U. S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 813-14 (9th Cir.
1990).
244. See Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993).
245. See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1995); Westlands Water
Dist. v. U. S. Dep't of
Interior, 850 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
246. Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supra note 61, at 413-14 (citing Madera Irrigation
Dist., 985 F.2d at 1400).
247. Id. at 415-16.
248. See, e.g., Central Ariz. Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Lujan, 764 F. Supp. 582, 591
(D. Ariz. 1991).
249. See, e.g., Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 805 F. Supp. 1503, 1507
(E.D. Cal. 1992), aFfd sub nom. Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667
(9th Cir. 1993).
250. See, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262
(9th Cir. 1984).
251. Benson, Whose WaterIs It?, supra note 61, at 414.
252. See United States v. Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 649 F. Supp. 487,
492 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (regarding reporting requirements of the Reclamation Reform
Act of 1982, 43 U.S.C. § 390ff).
253. See Pyramid Lake Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir.
1989).
254. See United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 878 F.2d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir.
1989).
255. SeeYuma County Water Users' Ass'n v. Udall, 231 F. Supp. 548, 549-50 (D.D.C.
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range of authority certainly anticipates the use of these discretionary
powers to control illegally spread water by allocating illegally used
quantities of water to other uses or withholding illegally used
quantities of water from delivery organizations or irrigators.
4.

Ordering Water Delivery Organizations to Cease Illegal Deliveries

The Bureau may also order its contractors-the water users
associations, irrigation districts, and other delivery organizations-to
cease illegal deliveries. Not only can the Bureau, as administrator of
the reclamation laws, order delivery organizations to abide by those
laws (so that the reclamation laws have "full force and effect"), but
individual irrigators must also certify, as a condition to receipt of
project water, compliance with the reclamation laws. 56 The Bureau
asserted this authority in 1993 by ordering the Umatilla Basin
to another district that did
irrigation district to stop delivering 5 water
7
not have a contract with the Bureau.
5.

Claiming Forfeiture of Illegally Used Water

illegally
The Bureau also has the authority to assert control over
258
Some
spread water by claiming the user forfeits such water.
contracts specifically state that if a district does not use any portion of
its contracted water for a given period of time, the district forfeits the
unused water and the Bureau has the right to deliver that water to
another user-presumably including instream uses. 9 Water use in
violation of contract provisions, especially use outside of project
6°
boundaries, may constitute a constructive failure to use that water.
The Bureau likely would have the authority to either adjust the
contract so that the user could legally use the spread water in the
previously unauthorized manner or place, or assert authority over the
illegally used water and re-allocate the water to another user or use. In
addition, the Reclamation Act adheres to the prior appropriation
doctrine, which asserts that water users who fail to exercise their water61
rights may lose those rights through forfeiture or abandonment.
Further, each of the Pacific Northwest states of Idaho, Montana,
Oregon, and Washington have statutes providing for forfeiture of
water rights if not used for a specified period of years without
1964).
256. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 43 U.S.C. § 390ff (1994) (irrigators shall
furnish "certificate that they are in compliance with the provisions of this subchapter
including a statement of the number of acres leased, the term of any lease, and a
certification that the rent paid reflects the reasonable value of the irrigation water to
the productivity of the land"). See also 43 C.F.R. § 426.18 (2000) (landholder
information requirements).
257. See Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 106.
258. 1& at lo9.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Russell, supra note 68, at 155; Benson, Maintainingthe Status Quo, supranote
71, at 887.
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adequate justification. 6 '
6.

Authority With Respect to Water Conservation

The 1982 Reclamation Reform Act requires the Secretary to
"encourage" consideration and incorporation of "prudent and
responsible water conservation measures in the operations of nonFederal recipients of irrigation water from Federal reclamation
projects, where such measures are shown to be economically feasible
for such non-Federal recipients."2 6' This water conservation provision
also requires that each district that has entered into a repayment or
water service contract "shall develop a water conservation plan which shall
contain definite goals, appropriate water conservation measures, and a
264
time schedule for meeting the water conservation objectives."
Although general in nature, this provision indicates the Bureau could
satisfy its duty to encourage ("shall... encourage") water conservation
by requiring districts to develop mandatory water conservation
measures and plans that specifically declare water spreading violative
of such plans. One district court looked to this provision in
determining NEPA required the Bureau to consider, in its adoption of
regulations implementing the Reclamation Reform Act, an alternative
that provided greater environmental benefits through water
conservation. 6 5
7.

Pursuing Remedies for Breach of Contract

Finally, the Bureau has the authority to stop water spreading by
pursuing remedies for breach of contract, including cessation of water
deliveries to unauthorized lands.2 6
A typical contract provision

262. IDAHO CODE § 42-222(2) (Michie Supp. 2000); MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-404(2)
(1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 540.610 (1999); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.14.160 (West
2001). Oregon's provision, for example, states:
Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the
use of water in this state. Whenever the owner of a perfected and developed
water right ceases or fails to use all or part of the water apropriated for a
period of five successive years, the failure to use shall estabish a rebuttable
presumption of forfeiture of all or part of the water right.
OR. REv. STAT. § 540.610(1).
263. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 43 U.S.C. § 390jj(a) (1994). "The Secretary
shall, pursuant to his authorities under otherwise existing Federal reclamation law,
encourage the full consideration and incorporation of... water conservation
measures." Id. See also 43 C.F.R. § 427.1(a) (2000) (requiring consideration of "water
conservation measures inall districts and for the operations by non-Federal recipients
of irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) water from Federal Reclamation
projects") (emphasis added).
264. 43 U.S.C. § 390jj(b) (emphasis added).
See also 43 C.F.R. § 427.1(b)
(development of a plan).
265. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Duvall, 777 F. Supp. 1533, 1542 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
The court stated, "[wihile the EA examines the economic effects of the four
alternatives considered, there is no discussion of the effect of water conservation. In
light of the express statutory language [of section 390jj], the absence of such an
alternative appears to be inconsistent with the Secretary's duty." Id.
266. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 108.
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restricting a delivery organization's authority to deliver water outside
its boundaries states: "Water furnished to the Contractor pursuant to
this contract shall not be sold, exchanged or otherwise disposed of for
use outside the Contractor's service area without prior written consent
of the contracting officer."267 In at least one case, irrigation districts in
Washington conceded that the Bureau could require them to stop
delivering water to irrigators who failed to comply with Bureau
regulations and requirements that were enforceable under the delivery
contracts .2
Some commentators, however, argue the Bureau's remedies for
breach of contract violations versus statutory violations are not
necessarily the same. In other words, the Bureau may not always have
the authority to order a cessation of deliveries, at least under breach of
contract theories. 269 This argument appears to be that, while the
Bureau may cease deliveries for unauthorized use outside of project
boundaries, the Bureau's ability to obtain a cessation of unauthorized
deliveries made outside of only the district's service area (but within
However, if the Bureau may halt
project boundaries) is limited.
unauthorized deliveries outside of both project and district boundaries,
then no good argument exists explaining why unauthorized deliveries
outside of district boundaries, but inside project boundaries, should
receive an implied special exemption from the general reclamation
statutory requirement that all uses of federal project water must be
authorized by the Bureau.27 ' Further, the contract provision above, for
example, clearly states the delivery organization must obtain Bureau
consent "for use outside the Contractor's service area," i.e. district
boundaries. That contract clause could not be clearer. Although the
argument against Bureau authority to cease unauthorized water
deliveries attempts to distinguish between statutory and contractual
remedies available to the Bureau, the bottom line is that, without
project authorization, contractual authorization, administrative
classification as irrigable, and satisfaction of state water rights, a district
has no right to deliver water to, and an irrigator has no right to use
water on, unauthorized lands.

267. Holmes & Achterman, supra note 201, at 23-15 n.47 (citing Contract Between
the United States and Stockton-East Water District Providing for Project Water Service
§ 10 (Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Contract No. 4-07-20-W0329) (Dec. 19,
1983)).
268. United States v. Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 649 F. Supp. 487, 492
(E.D. Wash. 1986).
269. Holmes & Achterman, supra note 201, at 23-14.
270. Id. at 23-15. The reclamation laws specifically provide for circumstances in
which the Bureau may have the authority to contract for deliveries outside of project
boundaries, including temporary rentals of surplus water for use on land excluded
from a project because it has been classified as unproductive or surplus water used for
purposes other than irrigation. 43 U.S.C. §§ 423, 521 (1994).
271. See 43 C.F.R. § 426.19(h) (2000) (directing districts to "[w]ithhold deliveries of
irrigation water to any landholder not eligible to receive irrigation water under the
certification or reporting requirements or any other provision of Federal reclamation
law and these regulations").
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In short, the discretionary authorities the Bureau may invoke to
satisfy its various duties in carrying out the reclamation laws are
myriad. One cannot argue that the Bureau "lacks the discretion to
influence" 2n the illegal spreading of federal project water. Therefore,
having established the Bureau's failure to control water spreading is an
"agency action" for purposes of invoking the requirements of section
7(a)(2), the discussion turns to the question of whether water
spreading "may affect" listed species.
E.

SHOWING THAT WATER SPREADING "MAYAFFECT" LISTED SPECIES

ESA consultation is mandatory when an agency determines its
proposed action "may affect listed species or critical habitat."2 73 As
discussed below, water spreading clearly "may affect" listed fish species
in the Columbia and Snake River Basins. Of course, many factors have
contributed and continue to contribute to the precipitous decline of
the salmon. 74 If federal resource managers choose to ignore one or
more of those factors, however, the burden to mitigate the problem
will continue to press on the remaining factors.
The best evidence and documentation that water spreading may
affect listed salmon comes from the federal government. Water
storage projects and irrigation withdrawals that decrease river flows
have perhaps the most devastating impact on listed salmon species. In
1993, NMFS designated critical habitat for Snake River salmon, and
stated water quantity was an essential element of listed salmon
conservation. 75

NMFS also noted that protection of critical habitat

would require "special management activities in areas outside the current
distribution of the listed species that have been determined to be essential
to the conservation of the species."2 76 In other words, actions well
beyond the banks of the streams of the Snake River Basin necessarily
impact the chances of recovery of listed salmon.

272. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995).
273. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). See also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d
1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985).
274. NMFS has stated that
[nlo single or primary factor could be identified as the primary cause for the
decline or as the primary source of mortality; but based on the combination
of factors affecting the continued existence of the species, NMFS determined
that the species were in danger of extinction or likely to become endangered
within the foreseeable future.
NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION: REINITIATION OF CONSULTATION ON
1994-1998 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND JUVENILE

PROGRAM
IN
1995 AND FUTURE YEARS 8 (1995)
at
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lpublcat/docu/hydro-bo.htm
(last modified Dec. 11,
2000) [hereinafter 1995 BiOp].
275. Designated Critical Habitat; Snake River Sockeye Salmon, Snake River
Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, and Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 58 Fed.
Reg. 68,543, 68,545 (Dec. 28, 1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 226).
276. Id. at 68,546 (emphasis added).
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1. The 1995 Hydropower Biological Opinion
In its 1995 biological opinion ("1995 BiOp") on the effects of the
Federal Columbia River Power System ("FCRPS") on endangered
Snake River salmon, NMFS concluded that, without modification, the
hydropower system would jeopardize listed species.2" The 1995 BiOp
discussed a number of reasonable and prudent alternatives FCRPS
agencies 278 should undertake to meet river flow objectives and avoid
jeopardy to listed salmon.2 " As an immediate action to improve the
chances of species survival, NMFS directed the FCRPS agencies to
"[i]mprove flows in the Columbia and Snake Rivers through additional
flow augmentation, and manage those flows on an in-season basis to
optimize fish survival."2 0 With respect to reclamation operations in
particular, NMFS directed that the Bureau
shall continue to provide the 427 thousand acre-feet (kaf) [annually]
of flow augmentation from the upper Snake River as identified in the
[Northwest] Power Planning Council's Strategy for Salmon in 1995a high probability
97, taking such actions as are necessary to ensure
211
of providing provision of that volume by 1998.
This 427 thousand acre-feet ("k.a.f.") represents the minimum
volume that the Bureau must provide. "The [Bureau] shall subsequently
secure an additional amount of water, in coordination with the states of
Idaho and Oregon, as may be necessary to further reduce human-caused
NMFS
mortality of endangered salmon in the Snake River."282
repeatedly emphasized this point by stating additionalwater for fish
flow augmentation is "essential to mitigate for disruption of the
Formal
natural runoff of the Columbia and Snake Rivers."28
consultation "shall be initiated" if the Bureau fails to make significant
84
is, both the 427 k.a.f.
progress "toward securing these volumes" M-that
flow augmentation, plus additional flows the Bureau secures through
285
other means.
277. 1995 BiOp, supra note 274, at 67-69. The 1995 BiOp was produced as a result
of Judge Marsh's order in 1994, rejecting NMFS's no jeopardy determination for
Columbia River hydropower operations. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994).
278. The "FCRPS agencies" are all of the federal agencies that conduct hydropower
operations on the Columbia-Snake River system: Army Corps of Engineers, Bonneville
Power Administration, and Bureau of Reclamation. 1995 BiOp, supra note 274, at 9.
279. Id,at 70-79.
280. Id. at 73. Hydropower operations have historically altered the Columbia and
Snake Rivers' hydrographs by storing the high natural peak flows of spring and then
releasing that stored water in the winter when energy demand is highest in the
Northwest. See also Blumm, supra note 17, at 119.
281. 1995 BiOp, supra note 274, at 76.
282. Id. (emphasis added).
283. Id.
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. The BiOp explicitly suggests dry year leases, land fallowing and purchases of
storage space, but the list is not exclusive. Id. Securing illegally spread water certainly
qualifies as an "effective means" of acquiring water as well. See discussion infra Part
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Although the BiOp did not make explicit the quantity of
additional water needed to ensure survival and recovery of listed
salmon, NFMS referred to specified quantities in other plans. The
Northwest Power Planning Council plan called for an additional one
million acre-feet ("m.a.f.") annually, and the state and tribal Detailed
Fisheries Operation Plan called for an additional 1.5 m.a.f. beyond the
427 k.a.f. from the upper Snake River.286 NMFS did not provide its own
quantification of the amount of additional water necessary, but stated
it "agrees that additional augmentation volumes are essential in the
Snake River during low flow years and during the summer migration
period and that the [Bureau] should take all reasonable steps to secure
additional water."2 7 Finally, although FCRPS agencies are "technically
not bound" by the reasonable and prudent measures in NMFS's BiOp,
"an agency that attempts to proceed with an action in the face of a
critical FWS biological opinion will almost certainly be8 found to have
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and contrary to law.",
2.

A Reasonable Step to Secure Additional Water: Eliminate Water
Spreading

Although the 1995 BiOp included only a short list of suggestionsdry year leases, land fallowing and purchases of water rights-for
possible actions the Bureau could take to secure additional amounts of
water for flow augmentation, several others certainly exist, including
the elimination of water spreading. As far back as 1983, the Bureau
itself recognized the problem in a land classification report, estimating
that 662,000 acres of unclassified lands were receiving project water in
western states, with two-thirds of that acreage in the Pacific
Northwest. 2 9 In a 1985 internal memorandum, the Bureau recognized
its monitoring and2revention policies with respect to water spreading
were "inadequate." A 1994 Office of Inspector General audit report
emphasized the Bureau had failed to control the problem since the
1985 study, and estimated 154,000 acres were receiving federal water
illegally.2' NMFS flatly called for the Bureau to stop the practice of
water spreading in the 1995 proposed recovery plan.
3.

The 1999 Snake River Biological Opinion

In 1999, NMFS issued a supplemental BiOp for operation and
V.E.2.
286. 1995 BiOp, supra note 274, at 76.
287. I&. (emphasis added).
288. Lone Rock Timber Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 842 F. Supp. 433, 437 (D. Or.
1994). See also Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1989).
289. 1983 BUREAU LAND CLASSMICATION AND EQUIVALENCY REPORT,supra note 166, at
10-11. See also Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 96 (citing the Report).
290. Memorandum from the Acting Commissioner, to the Regional Director 1 (May
17, 1985) (on file with author).
291. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, IRRIGATION OF INELIGIBLE
LANDS, BUREAu OF RECLAMATION, Report No. 94-1-930, 2, 6 (July 1994).
292. PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 43, at V-2-26.
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maintenance of the Bureau's Snake River projects above Lower
Granite Dam in eastern Washington2 3 The 1999 BiOp focused on the
Bureau's fulfillment of NMFS's reasonable and prudent measures
outlined in the 1995 hydropower BiOp.Y However, the 1999 BiOp
ignored the requirement that the Bureau secure water in addition to
427 k.a.f., focusing instead on the Bureau's efforts to meet that initial
requirement2 5 The only mention of water spreading appeared in a
small paragraph, stating "[t]he scale of water spreading at [the
Bureau's] projects covered by this Opinion is unknown.
Even
though the scale is ostensibly unknown, NMFS concluded, somewhat
contradictorily, that "the scale of water spreading is sufficiently small
that it does not adversely affect [the Bureau's] ability to supply" the
minimum 427 k.a.f. annually.2 7 Given the extensive recognition by the
Bureau and others of the extent of water spreading, the NMFS
statement that the scale of the problem is unknown in 1999 appears
somewhat disingenuous. In fact, even if the problem is of "sufficiently
small" scale, the Bureau still should use its authority to stop illegal
practices in order to gain even that "small" quantity of flow
augmentation beyond the minimum 427 k.a.f. required in the 1995
BiOp.
4.

The 2000 Hydropower Biological Opinion

Finally, in December 2000, NMFS released a biological opinion on
reinitiation of consultation on the long-term configuration of the
FCRPS.28 The 2000 BiOp sets out the hydrosystem and offsite
mitigation measures NMFS believes are biologically feasible and
implementable, sufficient to achieve maximum performance standards
without dam breaching, and sufficient to "result in a high likelihood of
survival and a moderate-to-high likelihood of recovery."2 Among the
actions recommended, NMFS states that the Bureau "shall provide
NMFS with a detailed progress report addressing possible instances
where [Bureau]-supplied water within the Columbia River basin is

293. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BUREAU OF RECLAMATION OPERATIONS AND
MAINTENANCE OF ITS PROJECrS IN THE SNAKE RIVER BASIN ABOvE LOWER GRANITE DAM: A
SUPPLEMENT TO THE BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS SIGNED ON MARCH 2, 1995, AND MAY 14, 1998
(1998), available at http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lpress/biopfina.html (last modified
Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter 1999 BiOp].
294. Id. at 6-8.
295. Id. at 11-12. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 17, Trout Unltd. v. Nat'i Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 00-262 MA (D. Or.
filed Feb. 17, 2000) (on file with author).
296. 1999 BiOp, supra note 293, at 29.
297. Id.
298. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION: REINITIATION OF
CONSULTATION ON OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM,

19 BUREAU OF
9-69
(2000),
at
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lhydrop/hydroweb/docs/Final/200OBiop.html
(last
modified Jan. 17, 2001) [hereinafter 2000 BiOp].
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being used without apparent [Bureau] authorization to irrigate
lands."3 0 The Bureau's report "shall indicate" how the agency will
identify and address such instances of unauthorized use-instances of
various forms of water spreading. 1 NMFS takes the position that
water spreading is not an agency action for purposes of section
7(a) (2), but leaves open the possibility that the Bureau must consult
on contract actions it takes against unauthorized water users:
Federal agencies are required to consult only on actions that are
"authorized, funded, or carried out by SUCh agency[.]" NMFS
recognizes that unauthorized uses of [Bureau]-supplied water are by
definition not "authorized, funded, or carried out' by [the Bureau].
As [the Bureau] works within the limits of its authority to address any
identified episode of unauthorized use of [Bureau]-supplied water,
NMFS recognizes that, in some instances,,,[the Bureau] will have to
take contract actions and consult on them. 0
In a separate section, NMFS describes how those consultations will
proceed, requiring the Bureau to report the nature and extent of
actual unauthorized use. 303
The 2000 BiOp also reiterates that Bureau projects across the
Columbia River Basin contribute to streamflow depletions during
juvenile salmon outmigration season, decreasing the frequency of
achieving the flow objectives needed to protect the fish." 4 To mitigate
this problem, NMFS states that "[b]efore entering into any agreement
to commit currently uncontracted water or storage space in any of its
reservoirs covered by this biological opinion to any other use than
salmon flow augmentation, [the Bureau] shall consult with NMFS
"'0' The
under ESA Section 7(a) (2).
Bureau must also consult with
NMFS before entering into any new contract or contract amendment
to increase the authorized acreage served by any irrigation district
receiving Bureau project water. 06 These consultations must identify
the "amount of discretionary storage or water being sought, the
current probability of such storage or water being available for salmon
flow augmentation, and any plan to replace the storage volume
currently available to salmon flow augmentation that would be lost as a
result of the proposed commitment." 7 In reviewing these Bureau
actions, NMFS will "ensure that there [will] be zero net impact from
any such [Bureau] commitment on the ability to meet the seasonal
flow objectives established in this biological opinion." 0

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 9-69.
Id.
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (1994)).
Id. at 9-68 to -69.
2000 BiOp, supra note 298, at 9-68.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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NMFS concludes by stating "current rates of water deliveries
adversely affect survival conditions in the migration corridor" and
3 9
0
"further depletions should be avoided until recovery is achieved."
This statement, combined with NMFS's concern over unauthorized
use of Bureau project water, seems to indicate that NMFS has backed
off somewhat from its statement in the 1999 BiOp that the scale of
water spreading is "sufficiently small that it does not adversely affect
[the Bureau's] ability to supply" 10 minimum adequate streamflows. In
short, given the Bureau's historical failure to assert any control over
water spreading, combined with NMFS's requirements the Bureau
secure additional water to increase flows, report on unauthorized uses
of federal water and consult on contract actions that seek to increase
authorized acreage, little doubt exists that the Bureau's current water
spreading management practices (or lack thereof) "may affect" listed
Snake River salmon.
V. CONCLUSION
The ESA is the most promising and readily available strategy to
control water spreading in the Pacific Northwest and to "reclaim"
water for endangered salmon that need adequate flows to ensure
Although a pointed and unequivocal
survival of their species.
assertion by the Bureau regarding its widespread authority to control
water spreading would be the most direct route to address the
problem, history suggests such an assertion is unlikely. The ESA may
provide a more encouraging and direct route to securing immediate
habitat protection for many salmon species that teeter on the brink of
extinction. Although the Bureau has failed to act to stop illegal water
spreading practices using project water, the Bureau clearly has a duty
to do so. This affirmative duty to act stems from the reclamation laws,
subsequently enacted federal environmental laws, and the federal trust
obligation to protect reserved Indian treaty rights.
To fulfill its duties and control water spreading, the Bureau also
has a myriad of discretionary authorities, including: promulgating
regulations, attaching conditions to water deliveries, allocating water
among eligible users, ordering the cessation of illegal deliveries,
causing forfeiture of illegally used project water, adopting water
conservation measures and plans, and pursuing breach of contract
remedies. Coupled with the duty to control water spreading, the
Bureau's discretionary authority to do so makes the Bureau's failure to
control water spreading an "agency action" for purposes of ESA
section 7(a) (2). Because NMFS's biological opinions have pointed to
inadequate low flows as one of the critical threats to the survival and
recovery of Columbia and Snake River Basin salmon, the Bureau's
failure to control water spreading clearly "may affect" those listed
species. In short, the Bureau's failure to control water spreading is an

309. Id.
310. 1999 BiOp, supra note 293, at 29.
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"agency action" that "may affect" listed salmon, and therefore is
subject to the requirements of ESA section 7(a) (2).
As a final note, one should recognize that many factors contribute
to the decline of the salmon-albeit some far more significantly than
others-and many human land uses and other activities exacerbate
each cause of decline. Control of water spreading in order to provide
increased flows and decrease polluted irrigation return flows is but one
strategy that will contribute to the survival and recovery of listed fish
species. The Pacific Northwest is faced with a looming choice among
the methods it will pursue to save endangered salmon. The prime
example pits flow augmentation by stopping illegal federal water
deliveries in the Snake River Basin against breaching the four lower
Snake River dams. " ' Put in more pragmatic terms, this ultimate and
inevitable extractive resource choice pits irrigated Idaho farms and the
Idaho Power Company against the "ocean port" of Lewiston, Idaho,
and large aluminum companies that reap the benefits of cheap Pacific
Northwest electricity." ' One hopes the choice is made soon enough to
save the salmon.
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SeeBlumm et al., supra note 36, at 1000.
See id.

